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COURTS AS INSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS:  
BANKRUPTCY AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 
 
Kathleen G. Noonan, Jonathan C. Lipson and William H. Simon* 
 
This article compares two spheres in which courts induce and oversee the restructuring of 
organizations that fail systematically to comply with their legal obligations: bankruptcy 
reorganization and public law litigation (civil rights or regulatory suits seeking structural 
remedies).  The analogies between bankruptcy and public law litigation (PLL) have grown 
stronger in recent years as structural decrees have evolved away from highly specific directives 
to “framework” decrees designed to induce engagement with stakeholders and make 
performance transparent.  We use the comparison with bankruptcy, where the value and 
legitimacy of judicial intervention are better understood and more accepted, to address 
prominent criticisms of PLL.  Our comparison shows that judicial intervention in both spheres 
responds to coordination problems that make individual stakeholder action ineffective, and it 
explains how courts in both spheres can require and channel major organizational change 
without administering the organizations themselves or inefficiently constricting the discretion of 
managers.  The comparison takes on greater urgency in light of the Trump Administration’s vow 
to “deconstruct the administrative state,” a promise which, if kept, will likely increase demand 
for PLL. 
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COURTS AS INSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS:  
BANKRUPTCY AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 
 
 I. Introduction 
 Large organizations sometimes fail, and when they do courts may be asked to 
provide a remedy.  Often, the remedy is restructuring.  Perhaps the largest categories of 
judicial restructuring are bankruptcy reorganization and “public law litigation” (PLL)—
civil rights or regulatory cases seeking structural relief against a government agency. 
Both types of intervention occur frequently, and contrary to some claims, there is no 
evidence that either is in terminal decline.1 
Bankruptcy and PLL address similar problems in similar ways, but PLL has 
proved vastly more controversial.  No one doubts that bankruptcy courts have the 
authority to facilitate massive change in troubled corporations.  While there are debates at 
the margins about how best to achieve bankruptcy’s goals, most commentators concede 
the effectiveness of such intervention in a substantial range of cases.   
There is, on the other hand, much more controversy about both the legitimacy and 
the efficacy of judicial efforts in public law litigation to reform prisons, schools, police 
departments and other public agencies.  Critics assert that judicial efforts to restructure 
public institutions are categorically undemocratic, or ineffective, or both.2 
 Yet, the rationales and the techniques of intervention are similar in both spheres.3  
Although the details of practice vary, the most characteristic form of bankruptcy 
reorganization resembles an increasingly common form of intervention in public law 
litigation.  Specifically, we compare the Chapter 11 “bootstrap” reorganization, in which 
the bankruptcy court supervises the restructuring of an organization that is expected to 
continue operation as a freestanding entity, with the PLL “framework” decree in which 
the district court induces fairly comprehensive reform, but focuses largely on governance 
and accountability structures rather than mandating specific practices. 
 Both types of intervention share important features: Judicial intervention is 
triggered by the demonstrated inability of the organization to satisfy large-scale legal 
                                                
1 See notes 33-43, infra, and sources cited there. 
2 E.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS 
RUN GOVERNMENT 10 (2003); John Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot?: The Inherent Remedial 
Authority of Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1996); DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL 
POLICY (1977).  We collect and address major criticisms in Part IV. 
3  In his seminal article defining and christening “public law litigation”, Abram Chayes pointed out the 
analogy to bankruptcy, noting that “[f]rom 1870 to 1933, federal judges reorganized over 1,000 railroads.”  
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1303 (1976).  He 
didn’t develop the analogy, however.  Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell, and later, Susan Sturm, 
seconded Chayes’ observation, but they did not develop it either.  Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. 
Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 485-86 
(1980); Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L. J. 1355, 1385, 1445 (1991). 
. 
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obligations.  Both types of relief respond to collective action problems that make 
individual claim adjudication impossible or inefficient.  The courts help the parties 
develop remedial frameworks that limit incumbent managers’ control over the 
organization for the benefit of stakeholders whose legal interests are jeopardized by its 
operations.  In various ways, courts force or persuade managers to account to and engage 
with the organizations’ stakeholders in order to comply with baseline obligations.   
 Critics mistakenly assume that PLL courts actually “run” the agencies they help to 
restructure.  But this is no more the case in PLL than in bankruptcy.  Rather, bankruptcy 
courts in Chapter 11 cases and district courts in PLL cases typically issue decrees that 
focus on broad issues of governance and accountability reflected in frameworks 
negotiated by the parties.  Like bankruptcy judges, district judges in PLL do not directly 
impose practices derived from doctrine or technical expertise.  In principle, the court 
withdraws when the debtor or defendant has given credible assurance that its 
reconfigured operations will respect the interests of the complaining stakeholders.  While 
PLL and corporate bankruptcy obviously differ in their details, courts and participants in 
these processes address them in substantially similar ways, an analogy that has for too 
long been ignored.  
Our comparison seeks to quiet anxieties about public law litigation and to enhance 
explanations about how it works.  By analogizing PLL to a less controversial area of 
practice, we emphasize that judicially-supervised organizational reform is not unique to 
public law, and that the most common criticisms of it are ill-informed or misplaced.  At 
the same time, the analogy facilitates generalizations about how this kind of judicial 
intervention works, and how it can be further improved.   
 Our analysis is also motivated by a sense of urgency.  The Trump Administration 
has vowed to “deconstruct the administrative state,”4 which implies, among other things, 
a reduction in the level and quality of services administered by public agencies.  A new 
wave of institutional reform litigation may be one response, whether to enforce existing 
decrees, or to address new grievances, or both.  In the near term, courts may face new and 
greater PLL challenges than they have in many years.   
 Part II gives a brief overview of the two spheres of reorganizational practice.  Part 
III reveals important similarities in these facially different areas of practice.  Part IV uses 
the comparison to bankruptcy to challenge major complaints about PLL, to establish 
affirmative grounds for judicially-supervised restructuring in both spheres, and to offer 
suggestions about further adaptation in PLL practice by analogy to bankruptcy.   
                                                
4 Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, Bannon vows a daily fight for ‘deconstruction of the administrative 
state’, Wash. Post., Feb. 23, 2017 available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-
vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-
d47f8cf9b643_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.c045781929a0 (accessed Aug. 26, 2017). 
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 II. Two Spheres of Court-Supervised Reorganization 
 A. Chapter 11 Reorganizations 
 Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the principal legal mechanism for 
restructuring troubled but viable business organizations.5  It prescribes a judicial process 
overseen by specialized, congressionally-created (Article I) courts that are “units” of, and 
supervised by, United States District (Article III) courts.6  
Bankruptcy courts have power that can be characterized as deep but 
circumscribed.  It is deep because the commencement of a case results immediately in the 
creation of an “estate” composed of all of the debtor’s property, and a nationwide 
injunction (the “automatic stay”) to shield that property from creditor collection actions.7  
This temporary injunction will largely become permanent if the debtor confirms a “plan 
of reorganization,” an instrument that shares important substantive features with the 
framework decree in public law litigation.8  It is circumscribed, however, because it is 
generally delimited by the “debtor-creditor relationship.”9  
Restructuring in this context has no single template, but typically involves the 
refinancing and discharge of debt, the sale of certain lines of business, entity 
reconfiguration, and changes in management and personnel and firm governance. 10  
Although there are many variations, we focus chiefly on the traditional “bootstrap” 
reorganization, where management remains in possession and control of the debtor, and 
proposes a reorganization plan whereby the company will remain a largely standalone, 
going concern after bankruptcy.11 
                                                
5 “Chapter 11” generally refers to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq., as well as other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code and Judicial Code.  The current version of the Bankruptcy Code was originally enacted in 1978 
(Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549), and has been amended several times, 
most recently in 2005. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 U.S.C.). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 
7 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 362(a).   
8 See In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1981) (observing that a reorganization plan 
“represents a kind of consent decree which has many attributes of a contract.”).  
9  Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article I Judicial Power, 
Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1195, 1226. 
10 As LoPucki and Doherty explain, companies in Chapter 11— 
may undergo tumultuous changes during bankruptcy. They may shrink in size, be split into 
multiple businesses, sell their businesses to new owners, discharge their managers, change their 
names, and fundamentally change the nature of their businesses. One or more businesses may 
survive after a bankruptcy, but it may nevertheless be difficult to say whether that survivor is the 
bankrupt company, a company that acquired the bankrupt company, or a company that acquired 
elements of the bankrupt company.  
Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Survival, 62 UCLA L. REV. 970, 979-80 (2015). 
11 There is some concern among practitioners and observers that bootstrap reorganizations are passe, and 
that Chapter 11 is now chiefly used to sell companies.  Baird and Rasmussen dramatically opened a 2002 
paper: “Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared.”  Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002).  Brubaker and Tabb have a more temperate view: 
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Some of the nation’s largest and most economically important companies have 
reorganized under Chapter 11, including General Motors12 and Chrysler13, every legacy 
commercial airline (e.g., American,14 United,15 Delta16), most companies with exposure 
to asbestos liability (e.g., Johns-Manville,17 W.R. Grace18), as well as many “big-box” 
retailers (e.g., RadioShack19), industrial firms (e.g., Lyondell Chemical20), and fossil-
fuel-related businesses (e.g., Energy Future Holdings21).  For the year ended June 30, 
2017, about 5,900 companies filed for Chapter 11 relief. 22  Since 1995, over 1000 very 
large companies—those with more than $100 million in assets and publicly-traded 
securities—have reorganized in this way.23 
Not all distressed firms successfully reorganize.  Those that try and fail will likely 
have their assets liquidated, either under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or through 
state-court or private proceedings.  The distinction between reorganization and 
liquidation suggests a somewhat starker set of choices than troubled companies actually 
face, however.  Although the bootstrap remains an important, perhaps the modal, form of 
reorganization, many corporate debtors sell some or all assets or lines of business through 
the Chapter 11 process, even as they may remain going concerns.  The key point is that 
the company, or a readily identifiable portion of it, survives in altered form 
presumptively better able to address the needs of stakeholders.   
                                                                                                                                            
“As the history of corporate reorganization practice makes abundantly clear (from the equity 
receiverships of the nineteenth century to the modern-day Chrysler and GM “reorganizations”), 
“any particular ‘plan’ can be structured as a ‘sale,’ and any ‘sale’ can be effectuated though a 
‘plan’ structure,” such that “there actually is no clean, clear distinction between reorganization by 
‘plan’ and reorganization by ‘sale’—through the wonders of sophisticated transaction engineering, 
each can be the precise functional equivalent of the other.”  
Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of 
Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1379.  Whether the company is sold or remains independent, 
the court’s intervention involves oversight of the construction of a new organizational framework.  
12 In re Gen.Motors Corp., Case No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
13 In re Old Carco LLC (f/k/a Chrysler LLC), Case No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
14 In re AMR Corp., Case No. 11-15463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
15 In re UAL Corp., Case No. 02-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006). 
16 In re Delta Airlines, Inc., et al., Case No. 05-17923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
17 Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1988). 
18 In re W.R. Grace & Co., Case No. 01-01139 (Bankr. Del. 2011).  
19 In re RadioShack Corp., et al., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015). 
20In re Lyondell Chem. Co., Case No. 09-10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
21 Energy Future Holdings Corp., et al., Case No. 14-10979 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014). 
22 U.S. COURTS, TABLE F-2—U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS BANKRUPTCY FILINGS (June 30, 2017), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/bf_f2_0630.2017.pdf.  
23  A window on the world of big-case bankruptcy, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH 
DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu (adjusted to 1980 dollar valuations).  
DRAFT OF 20171204 
5 
 
Wealth maximization is the principal normative justification and metric in such 
cases.  “Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used 
in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap”’ in a liquidation, the Supreme Court has 
stated.24  Few observers challenge this presumption, or the judicially-centered approach 
Congress has selected.25  This may be because in broad terms, it is viewed as largely 
successful.  One recent study of very large company reorganizations found that 70% 
succeed in the sense that they remain going concerns, either independently or as 
identifiable parts of other companies.26   
 Critics have occasionally proposed that the court’s role in business reorganization 
be transferred to an agency.  They argue that this essentially administrative role is more 
appropriate to the executive branch.27  Indeed, when banks and insurance companies fail, 
they are not permitted to use bankruptcy, but instead are overseen by regulators.28  While 
it is true that bankruptcy is the only major Congressional power to be implemented 
almost entirely through courts,29 many find that the greater transparency and political 
independence of the courts offer substantial advantages.    
 Judicially-supervised corporate restructuring is not limited to bankruptcy courts. 
All states have receivership and analogous statutes that permit the restructuring of some 
organizations within that state.  When debtors such as banks or insurance companies  
cannot use bankruptcy or when a debtor’s assets and creditors are concentrated in a single 
state, such proceedings may be used instead of bankruptcy. While this may be rare, state 
courts acting in this capacity function much like a federal bankruptcy court in Chapter 11.  
In the Ambac case, for example, a state court in Wisconsin supervised the restructuring of 
an insurance company subsidiary and coordinated its efforts with the bankruptcy court in 
New York, which supervised the Chapter 11 case of the parent holding company.30   
                                                
24 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983). 
25 This has not always been the case.  Some early critics argued that the system was inherently inefficient 
and should be abandoned.  Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050 (1992).  More recent studies suggest that the system operates in a reasonably 
efficient manner.  See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A 
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 606 (2009). 
26  LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 972.  Success in reorganization (understood as a confirmed plan) 
appears to be a function, in part, of size. See Jonathan C. Lipson and, Christopher Fiore Marotta, Examining 
Success, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 37 (2016) (finding in sample of about 1200 cases that 90% of cases 
involving over $100 million in assets confirmed plans while only half of smaller cases did so). 
27  The so-called Brookings Study proposed administrative resolution for consumer cases.  DAVID T. 
STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY:  PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 196-218 (1971).  Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank reforms would have much this effect for the “orderly liquidation” of “systemically important 
financial institutions.”  Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis of 
Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 673, 738 (2015) (citing 176 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010). 
28 11 U.S.C. § 109(b). 
29 Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards A Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 605, 644 (2008). 
30 See Michael J. de la Merced, Ambac Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, available at 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/ambac-files-for-bankruptcy/?_r=0. 
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 B. Public Law Litigation 
 Structural injunctions address a broad range of the operations of government 
agency defendants.  These decrees are most strongly identified with civil rights claims, 
but they can be found in other areas.31  Public law litigation is most closely identified 
with the federal courts, but a substantial number of structural decrees have emerged from 
state courts, including some of the most ambitious.32 Since the mid-1990s when the 
Supreme Court reversed two structural decrees as abuses of remedial discretion, PLL has 
sometimes been described as moribund33, but as with similar assertions in bankruptcy, 
such claims are exaggerated.34  
 The area where the claim of decline has been most thoroughly studied is 
incarceration.  This is the sector where there has been the strongest pushback against 
systemic relief, both from appellate decisions heightening proof burdens and a federal 
statute designed to restrict remedial discretion. Margo Schlanger reports that, while the 
number of orders has declined and their scope has narrowed in recent decades, structural 
intervention still plays a prominent role in prison reform.  In 2011, the Supreme Court 
affirmed a population cap order effectively requiring the release of tens of thousands of 
prisoners in California.  In 2006, the latest date for which data is available, about a third 
                                                
31  They have occurred in many complex environmental controversies.  E.g., CHARLES M HAAR, 
MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR: COURTS, DOLPHINS, AND IMPERILED WATERS (2005) (describing the court-
induced clean-up of Boston Harbor).  They also have a long lineage in antitrust law.  RICHARD EPSTEIN, 
ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2007).  And they have some resemblance to 
recent practice in which corporations agree to submit to monitoring and adopt compliance procedures in 
return for deferral of prosecution for violation of, for example, the securities laws or the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.  BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS (2014). 
32 E.g., Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 379 Mass. 703 (1980) (approving decree reforming the Boston 
Housing Authority); HAAR, supra note 31, (chronicling the judicially-supervised clean-up of Boston 
harbor); CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1998) 
(chronicling the decades-long judicial efforts to induce reform of exclusionary zoning practices in New 
Jersey). 
33 E.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 
1195 (2009) (characterizing the structural injunction as “a dying breed”); Gillian Metzger, The 
Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L. J. 1836 1860-61 (2015) (doubting the “broad availability of 
systemic challenges”).  The two famous cases reversing systemic relief are Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 
(1995), a school desegregation case, and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), a prison case. 
34 Since the reversal in Casey, the Court has upheld extensive structural relief in the prison context.  Brown 
v. Plata, 563 US 493 (2011) (upholding order likely to require release of thousands of prisoners). The 
Court’s post-Jenkins decision rejecting gender segregation at Virginia Military Institute foreseeably 
required a complex remedial response (though here judicial supervision turned out to be less intense).  US 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Katherine Bartlett, Unconstitutionally Male?: The Story of United States 
v. Virginia, in Woman and the Law Stories xx, xx-xx (Elizabeth Schneider and Stephanie Wildman eds 
2010).  In their critique of structural injunctions, Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod noted a widespread 
belief that the practice is “over and done with” but rejected the belief as mistaken.  SANDLER & 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 10.  Other scholars noting the continued vitality of PLL include Myriam 
Gilles, An Autopsy on the Structural Reform Injunction: Ooops … It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
143 (2003); Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIGATION 113 
(2007); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds,  117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).  See also the recent sources cited below in notes []. 
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of the prisoners in California’s local jails and eleven percent of the nationwide jail 
population were in facilities covered by framework decrees governing inmate 
population.35   
 The story is similar in other areas: a decline in number and narrowing in scope of 
structural orders, but still a substantial number of pending cases and active decrees that 
are a major influence in many jurisdictions on schools,36 mental health institutions,37 
police departments, 38  child protection agencies, 39  and environmental regulation and 
management agencies. 40   For example, a 2006 survey of child protective services 
litigation reports that in the preceding ten years, class actions against child welfare 
agencies had been initiated in 30 states and that consent decrees or settlement agreements 
were in effect in all of them.41  Or to take another example, since 1994, when Congress 
authorized the Department of Justice to seek systemic relief for police misconduct, the 
Department has achieved broad consent decrees or settlement agreements with the police 
agencies of more than 20 cities, including some of the biggest in the country.42  New 
York City recently operated under 26 settlement agreements or decrees mandating broad 
administrative relief.43 
 To be sure, there have been changes over the years in the form judicial 
intervention takes.  As we show below, some of these changes respond to critiques of 
structural decrees; yet critical discussion has not always acknowledged these changes.  
Those whose knowledge of the legal system derives from appellate opinions are likely to 
be under-informed, since appellate discussion is often out of touch with lower court 
practice.  The misapprehension is due in part to the fact that many cases settle and are not 
appealed.  (Consent decrees can sometimes be challenged on appeal where interveners 
                                                
35 Margo Schlanger, Brown v. Plata and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 165, 197-98 (2013) (reporting data on jail orders); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions 
Over Times: A Study of Jail and Prison Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 576-82, 602-05 (2006) (reporting 
data on numbers of cases and orders and scope of decrees). 
36 Lauren Gillespie, The Fourth Wave of Educational Finance: Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate 
Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (2010); David Rostetter & Katrina Arndt, Class Action Lawsuits and 
Consent Decrees in Special Education: Recommendations for Practice, 23 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 195 
(2012). 
37 Samuel Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 
(2012). 
38 SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 48-49 (2d ed. 
2014); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem of 
Police Accountability, 22 YALE J. REG. 1 (2016). 
39 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, CHILD WELFARE CONSENT DECREES: AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-
FIVE COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005 (October 2005). 
40 E.g., Nathan Matthews, Rewatering the San Joaquin River: A Summary of the Friant Dam Litigation, 34 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1109 (2007); HAAR, supra note 31. 
41 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, supra note 39, at 2. 
42 WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 38, at 48-49. 
43 E-mail from Thomas Crane, Chief, General Litigation Division, New York City Law Department, to 
William H. Simon (June 29, 2015). 
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object or a defendant seeks modification, but such appeals are rare.)  Misapprehension 
also arises from the fact that practice has evolved in ways that make some of the concerns 
expressed in appellate cases irrelevant, as we elaborate below.44  
 III.  Comparing Bankruptcy and Public Law Litigation 
 This part compares and contrasts key features of judicially-supervised 
reorganization in bankruptcy and public law litigation, including the rationale for 
structural intervention, the required prima facie showing, stakeholder representation, 
formulation and implementation of the remedy, and termination of the court’s 
involvement.  In all of these matters, there are important analogies between the work of 
bankruptcy courts and that of PLL courts. 
 A. The Rationale for Structural Intervention 
 Intervention in both spheres is a response to coordination problems presented by 
multiple individual claim assertion and, in addition, by the need to protect vulnerable 
stakeholders who would not be able to assert claims effectively as individuals.   
 1. Bankruptcy 
The basic premise of corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 is that the debtor 
is or soon will be unable to fulfill its legal obligations on a large scale. The debtor’s 
obligations may arise under contracts (as with bonds or loan agreements), in tort (as with 
such famous examples as asbestosis and mesothelioma), or otherwise (e.g., tax 
obligations).  In the absence of bankruptcy, debts can be collected only on an individual 
basis, usually in a state court of general jurisdiction. Large corporate debtors may have 
hundreds or thousands of creditors, 45  and may have defaulted as to many of them. 
Applicable state law is likely to follow the “race of diligence” model, meaning that the 
first creditor to obtain a judgment and execute on it will have first priority in the debtor’s 
                                                
44  A 2011 Supreme Court case involving a private damage action against Wal-Mart appears to have 
prompted courts to take a stricter view of class certification in public law litigation.  David Marcus, The 
Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777 (2016) (documenting and criticizing this development).  
The recent cases require a more extensive preliminary showing than in the past.  Nevertheless, most well-
prepared and adequately funded public law claims should be able to satisfy the requirement.  For recently 
certified public law claims, see, e.g., Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) (challenging prison 
health care); Gray v. County of Riverside, 2014 WL 5304915 (C.D. Cal. 2014)(challenging jail conditions); 
DL v. District of Columbia, 312 F.R.D. 1 (DDC 2015) (challenging administration of special education); 
Unknown Parties v. Johnson, 163 F. Supp. 3d 630 (2016) (challenging jail conditions); Fish v. Kobach, 
2016 WL 4060262 (D. Kan. 2016) (challenging voting restrictions). 
45See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., No. 09-50026, 2009 WL 1959233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (71,312 
claims according to cert.gardencitygroup.com/aps/fs/searcher); In re RS Legacy Corp. [Radio Shack], No. 
15-10197, 2016 WL 1084400 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (15,919 claims according to Prime Clerk - 
https://cases.primeclerk.com/radioshack/Home-ClaimInfo); Energy Future Holdings, No. 14-10979, 2014 
WL 3828283 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014) (7,608 claims according to Epiq Systems Debtor Matrix –
dm.epiq11.com/EFH/claim); and In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., No. 15-01145, 2015 WL 302749 
(Bkrtcy. N.D.Ill. 2015) (5,719 claims according to Prime Clerk, cases.primeclerk.com/ceoc/Home-
ClaimInfo).  The number of claims is likely greater than the number of creditors, as creditors may file 
multiple or duplicative claims. 
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unencumbered assets.46  This will generally be true regardless of the size or source of the 
creditor’s claim.  Collection is characterized as a race because it is largely a function of 
speed through the judicial system.  For a debtor with many creditors, it is likely to be 
highly inefficient and distributively arbitrary. 
 Inefficiencies stem largely from coordination failures and information 
asymmetries.  Absent bankruptcy, every claim must be prosecuted through a complaint 
and, assuming no defense, a default judgment which is then used as the basis for seizing 
property, usually through the ministrations of a sheriff or receiver in the jurisdiction in 
which the creditor may find the debtor’s property.47  Any given creditor is unlikely to 
know the position of all (or even many) other creditors in the race of diligence, and thus 
their respective relative priority in the debtor’s assets.  Even if they were to obtain this 
information, it would be difficult to know whether the debtor’s assets were sufficient to 
satisfy all claims or, more plausibly, which claims, since the debtor’s assets almost 
certainly would be insufficient to pay all creditors in full.48   
 Some creditors will succeed, however, and they will have the power to force a 
sale of the debtor’s assets to satisfy their claims and the attendant administrative costs.  
Because sheriffs and receivers cannot generally seize or sell property outside of their 
jurisdictions, creditors of a multi-jurisdictional debtor (which would be most large 
corporations) face significant coordination problems.  The historic example is the 
railroad:  if “the lines of the road [were] broken up and fragments thereof placed in the 
hands of various receivers, and the rolling stock, materials, and supplies seized and 
scattered abroad, the result would be irreparable injury to all persons having any interest 
in said line of road.”49  
 It seems unlikely that creditors could avoid the inefficiencies of individual 
collection actions by organizing and renegotiating their relationships without direct or 
indirect judicial assistance.  Most large debtors will have complex capital structures 
which produce webs of interrelated debts.  A single debtor may be composed of many 
subsidiaries and affiliates, each of which may have separate or shared financial creditors 
                                                
46 We discuss the rights of secured creditors below, and put to one side the effect that statutory liens may 
have for select creditors (e.g., “mechanics’ liens”).   
47 See, e.g., Penn. R. Civ. P. 3023 & 3104 (regarding judgment liens and execution). 
48 Creditors could form groups and pursue their claims collectively.  But in cases with widely dispersed 
creditors, such as bondholders, or creditors whose claims may be contingent and unliquidated, such as tort 
creditors, coordination is likely to be difficult, if not impossible.  Given the temporal nature of state-
collection law, creditors are likely to view themselves as competitors for the debtor’s limited assets, not 
allies.   
49 Oscar Lasdon, The Evolution of Railroad Reorganization, 88 BANKING L.J. 3, 6 (1971). Landon was 
discussing the federal equity receivership of the 1884 receivership of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific 
Railway (Wabash) that receivers be appointed due to the impending default of one of more than 30 
mortgages it had granted. Wabash was the first American railway system to do this in federal court on its 
own initiative.  See DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, 63-64 (2001) (discussing precedent-setting nature 
of the Wabash receivership). 
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(e.g., banks and bondholders).50  In many cases, some but not all debtors in a corporate 
group will also have obligations to general unsecured trade creditors, taxing authorities, 
and perhaps tort claimants or terminated employees seeking recovery.51  Bankruptcy 
exists because it is usually difficult for such heterogeneous claimants to coordinate when 
the debtor encounters financial distress.52 
 Market-coordination can occur through the renegotiation of major defaulted debt 
contracts.  Although these negotiations often work, they are sometimes precluded by the 
number and diversity of creditor interests.53  This has led to a dynamic where some 
creditors may be tempted to hold out for a better deal.54  Bankruptcy addresses these 
coordination failures directly through the automatic stay, if a case is commenced.  Even if 
a case is not commenced, the threat of bankruptcy is a major factor in bringing 
recalcitrant parties to the table.  Thus, actual or potential bankruptcy is a major factor in 
coordinating otherwise dispersed and potentially adverse creditors. 
 The market is also unlikely to correct distributive imbalances in the restructuring 
process.  Such imbalances may arise because some stakeholders are more sophisticated 
and better-resourced than others. The well-endowed can exploit collective action failures 
to gain relatively greater recovery shares.  Professionalized distress investors, sometimes 
known as “vulture funds,” can in some cases manipulate the process to increase their own 
recoveries at the expense of less sophisticated stakeholders, such as unrepresented 
employees.  
Small public shareholders and employees have been thought especially vulnerable 
to disproportionate loss of the debtor’s going concern value in a liquidation for the 
                                                
50  General Growth Properties, the largest real-estate-based Chapter 11, had 160 special-purpose 
subsidiaries.  In re General Growth Props. Inc., Case No. 09-11977 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 
2009). 
51 For example, property a debtor acquires after commencement of the case is unlikely to be encumbered by 
a pre-bankruptcy lien, even if the security agreement had a so-called “after-acquired property” clause 
purporting to encumber such property.  Bankruptcy Code § 552 specifically disables such provisions.  11 
U.S.C. § 552(a). Thus, revenue earned during the case could be unencumbered, and may be available to 
general unsecured creditors under a reorganization plan, free from a pre-bankruptcy lien.   
52 To be sure, there have been interesting proposals to promote ex ante coordination, e.g., through charter or 
other contractual mechanisms that might effectively cash out of all creditors upon general default.  See, 
e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 323, 332–33 (1993) (proposing that debt be treated as “chameleon equity” on default).  While 
these models “may have been elegant, their particular proposals seem not to have appealed to the institution 
contractualists extolled—the market, where they remain largely unused.”  See Jonathan C. Lipson, 
Bargaining Bankrupt:  A Relational Theory of Contract in Bankruptcy, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 239 (2016).  
53  Although there have been recent developments on this front, courts historically viewed the Trust 
Indenture Act as requiring strict unanimity among bondholders in pre-bankruptcy workouts.  See 
Marblegate Asset Mgmt., et al. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., et al., Dkt No. 15-2124-cv(L), 15-2141-cv (CON) 
(2d Cir. Jan. 17, 2017) rev’g Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 542, 
556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 
(1987)).  
54 The dynamic is exacerbated by provisions of the Trust Indenture Act that prohibit material changes to a 
bond indenture absent unanimous consent of bondholders, which is usually difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain.  See Roe, supra note 53.  
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benefit of the senior creditors.  Shareholders are protected by the possibilities of a 
representative committee and a vote on a reorganization plan, if the debtor is plausibly 
solvent.55 Deeming the interests of employees of “special social importance”, Congress 
has given them enhanced protection.56  It is, for example, harder for the debtor to escape 
collective bargaining agreements than other contracts.57  Wage claims have priority above 
most other debts.58  Debtors may pay in full and immediately (that is, during the case) 
prebankruptcy wage claims that might otherwise be paid fractionally at the end of the 
case, as well as outstanding claims of so-called “critical vendors.”59   
  2. Public Law Litigation  
 As in bankruptcy, the basic premise of structural relief in public law litigation is 
that the defendant on its current course is or soon will be unable to fulfill its legal 
obligations, and individual relief would be inefficient, distributively arbitrary, or 
unresponsive to some aspects of the claim.  In each of these situations, individual relief is 
“inadequate” in the sense of traditional equity jurisprudence, though the rights at stake 
often arise from modern welfare and regulatory programs rather than the common law 
rights around which traditional doctrine developed. 
 Inadequacy can arise in at least three forms.  The second and third are analogous 
to rationales for bankruptcy. 
 First, the plaintiffs’ claim may directly implicate a collective good or practice that 
cannot be altered on an individual basis.  The classic instance is desegregation.  Given the 
social and psychological dimensions of discrimination, it would not be satisfactory, or 
perhaps even intelligible, to order the defendant to stop discriminating against an 
individual student while it continued to discriminate against others like her in the same 
institution.  Many environmental claims have an analogous quality.  The substantive right 
is defined largely as a right to enjoy a natural environment in a condition untainted by 
improper practices. Since the good here is indivisible, specific enforcement would not be 
possible on an individualized basis.  In both the desegregation and environmental cases, 
individual monetary relief would be possible but would have two disadvantages.  It 
would be incommensurate with any non-material dimension of the claim.  And it would 
be hard to calculate even the material damage numerically.   
 A second reason why legal remedies may be inadequate is that, to the extent that 
individual harms are foreseeable and preventable, it may be more efficient and more just 
to intervene preventively than to compensate post hoc.  Even if we assume that prison 
                                                
55 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(2) & 1104.  See also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining 
over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 125 (1990). 
56 S. Rep. No. 1106, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978). 
57 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113.  
58 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4).  See also Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986, 197 L. Ed. 2d 
398 (2017) (Congress established employee wage priority “to alleviate in some degree the hardship that 
unemployment usually brings to workers and their families” when an employer files for bankruptcy) 
(quoting United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 32, 79 S.Ct. 554, 3 L.Ed.2d 601 (1959))). 
59 See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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violations of the Eighth Amendment can be fairly compensated monetarily, it might be 
less costly to do so with systemic relief.  If, for example, a court can reliably determine 
that a prison system that delegates power to favored inmates (“trusties”) to discipline 
their fellow prisoners will cause many more violations than an alternative system that 
serves the defendant’s legitimate purposes as well, the most efficient remedy may be to 
enjoin the “trustie” regime.60   
 Note that the efficiency calculation in PLL has to consider, not only the 
procedural costs of the individual claims that are likely to be brought, but the costs of 
injuries that, in the absence of systemic relief, will never give rise to claims because the 
victims lack the information, resources, or security to bring the claims.  In prisons, for 
example, it seems likely that only a fraction of meritorious claims come to the attention 
of the courts because prisoners lack the ability to identify them, or the ability to advance 
them, or plausibly fear retaliation by prison personnel.  At the same time, many non-
meritorious individual claims are filed in court by prisoners, usually in propria persona.  
Prison officials seem content with this system of individual relief because it rarely results 
in orders that interfere with their discretion.61  But they might feel differently if prisoners 
were able to effectively assert all the valid individual claims that arise.  Under those 
circumstances, they might prefer structural relief to a long series of varying and 
potentially inconsistent individual orders.  Here, PLL resembles bankruptcy’s effort to 
protect employees and small general creditors.  The goal is not only to avoid the 
inefficiencies of individual claim-assertion, but also to mitigate vulnerabilities that would 
prevent some stakeholders from asserting claims at all. 
 Third, individual relief against public agencies can be distributively arbitrary in 
various respects.  To begin, it is at least theoretically possible that, if all claimants with 
valid claims were able to obtain individual money judgments, the defendant’s resources 
could be exhausted before all claims were paid.  This virtually never happens, however.  
On the other hand, it is not unusual for resources to be diverted away from activities that 
are not subject to claim pressure in order to satisfy individual claims.  It is expensive for 
school districts to adjudicate and fund relief for “special education” claims, and it is often 
asserted that this result reduces resources, and consequently, quality, for regular 
education programs.  If the special education students have stronger claims to these 
resources than the other students, this result might be justifiable.  But general education 
students have various rights as well that might be jeopardized by a reduction in 
resources. 62   Like the race of diligence that creditors run before bankruptcy, 
individualized relief in PLL could produce results harmful to those least able to assert 
their claims.   
                                                
60 See David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 
51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1057-62 (2004) (describing trend in prison cases to prohibit inmate 
disciplinarians). 
61   See Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in Hospitals, A Large 
Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L. 44 (2008) (concluding that “it is rare in corrections that . . . 
information [from individual claims] is used to strategize harm reduction”).  
62 See MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT 
OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1998); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 91-92. 
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 The same limitations can arise with class relief that takes the form of very specific 
directives.  An injunction mandating compliance with deadlines for processing 
applications may result in greater delay in responding to requests from those who are 
already receiving benefits.  Such distributive issues cannot be readily considered in the 
context of individual claims.  They are more plausibly considered in structural decrees 
that more generally address the sources and uses of those resources. 
 The problem of collateral effects, or “polycentricity,” is often said to be an 
objection to structural relief.63   But individual relief does not avoid the problem of 
polycentricity.  Not only do individual monetary claims potentially draw resources from 
other activities, but individual injunctive relief creates the possibility of arbitrarily 
differentiated norms.  Bespoke orders might reflect widely varying understandings across 
different courts or judges.  In general, the broader the decree, the more it can potentially 
address collateral effects.  Thus, polycentricity is not considered a problem in bankruptcy 
because the decree there—the plan of reorganization—is all-encompassing, addressing all 
of the debtor’s operations, as well as its assets and liabilities. 
 As bankruptcy is commonly seen as a response to market failure, Public Law 
Litigation might be seen as a response to political failure.  Two broad kinds of political 
failure may produce the kind of systemic non-compliance that calls for structural relief. 
 The first is that electoral processes may be unfairly hostile or selectively 
indifferent to vulnerable people and groups.  Some constitutional rights may be clear and 
yet not attract majoritarian support in the electoral process.  Or legislatures may find it 
expedient to enact statutory rights for vulnerable people while neglecting to provide 
adequate enforcement.  Or officials may use their discretion to pursue selfish and 
idiosyncratic goals. 
 The second form of political failure arises from the fragmentation of executive 
authority.  The most common collective action problems in PLL, as in bankruptcy, arise 
among stakeholders, but some PLL cases also present such problems on the agency side.  
Authority to implement statutory mandates is often divided among multiple governmental 
units that may have difficulty coordinating.  The Boston Harbor clean-up case is an 
extreme but revealing example.64  There was a good deal of political mobilization in 
support of cleaning up the harbor, and very little broad-based opposition.  Yet, for 
decades, this mobilization had failed to induce meaningful action.  The key reason 
appears to have been the extreme division of responsibility among federal, state, local, 
and regional government entities and within each level, among multiple agencies with 
overlapping subject-matter jurisdictions.65  Coordination among all these entities was 
                                                
63 E.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 55-56. 
64 See HAAR, supra note 31. 
65  See id., at 64-78.  Some political scientists have argued that excessive fragmentation of executive 
authority is a key source of American governmental dysfunction.  FRANCES FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER 
AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 488-
505 (2014); Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King, The Political Crisis of the American State: The 
Unsustainable State in a Time of Unraveling, in The Unsustainable American State 3-33 (Lawrence Jacobs 
and Desmond King eds 2009).  A study of PLL in Colombia focusing on litigation on behalf of internally 
displaced people argues that excessive fragmentation of executive implementation authority is an important 
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difficult, and responsibility was diffuse.  The key intervention of the court was to 
facilitate and motivate coordination among these dispersed actors. 
 Underlying the political dysfunction rationale is the value of the rule of law.  This 
value limits the deference that courts can give legislatures and executive officials in 
situations of systemic non-compliance.  Legislatures have broad discretion with respect to 
enforcement procedures, and executive officials have broad discretion when they operate 
within such procedures.  But even with respect to rights that are not constitutionally 
entailed, the legislature is not free to create rights without providing for their 
enforcement.  And executive officials should be accountable for their implementation 
decisions.  The limits of this rule-of-law principle are uncertain, but no one rejects it 
categorically, and some version of it appears to underlie structural intervention in both 
PLL66 and in bankruptcy.67 
 B. The Prima Facie Case 
 The core of the prima facie case in both spheres is a showing that the defendant 
organization as presently constituted is failing to fulfill its legal obligations.   
1. Bankruptcy 
Financial distress is the heart of the prima facie case fora Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy doctrine and practice sharply distinguish between “voluntary” cases, which 
are “easy” to commence, and “involuntary” cases, which are not.  A voluntary 
bankruptcy is one that managers of the debtor (in particular, directors) choose to 
commence.  The Bankruptcy Code does not require a particular level of financial distress 
to commence a voluntary reorganization under Chapter 11, such as technical insolvency; 
                                                                                                                                            
rationale for judicial intervention.  CESAR RODRIGUEZ-GARAVITO & DIANA RODRIGUEZ-FRANCO, RADICAL 
DEPRIVATION ON TRIAL: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 63-75 (2015).   
66 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (stating that the US “would cease to deserve th[e] high 
appellation [of a government of laws] if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal 
right”); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that the constitution requires adequate 
enforcement procedures for some nonconstitutional rights and that adequacy depends in part on the 
importance of the right). But authority has not always been clear or consistent on this point.  See RICHARD 
FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003) (noting ambiguities in the Supreme Court’s commitment to the 
principle that the Constitution entails that there be practical opportunities to enforce rights).  Compare 
Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747 (1990) (arguing that constitutional due 
process does not constrain legislative discretion with respect to enforcement procedures for welfare rights) 
with William H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. 
REV. 777 (1990) (arguing that constitutional due process requires reasonably effective procedures to 
enforce welfare rights).  Recall that the classic statement of the rule-of-law ideal emphasizes the 
importance of effective enforcement procedures for substantive rules.  ALFRED VENN DICEY, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 107-22 (8th ed. 1915).  
67 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986, 197 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2017)(forbidding “rare case” 
exceptions to deviations from priority rules on rule-of-law grounds); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. 
Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012) (observing that the 
“Bankruptcy Code standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law”). 
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it is enough that management believes in good faith that the debtor is, or will soon be, 
unable to pay its debts.68  
The task of establishing the prima facie case for corporate reorganization changes 
when management resists.  If corporate managers deny that the debtor is in trouble, but 
creditors believe that a bankruptcy for the debtor would be in their interest, creditors may 
commence an involuntary case. 69   The prima facie case for forcing a debtor into 
bankruptcy is a function of both scale and financial condition. A corporate debtor with 
more than 11 creditors cannot be forced into bankruptcy unless at least three creditors 
holding in excess of about $15,000 in unsecured claims join the petition. 70   Those 
creditors must be prepared to show that the debtor is “not generally paying its debts as 
they fall due.”71  
Creditors may commence an involuntary bankruptcy because they fear that they 
are about to lose the race of diligence and want to prevent others from levying on the 
debtor’s property. They may also worry that the debtor’s management will plunder the 
debtor or simply continue to mismanage it.  Yet, an inappropriate bankruptcy can 
seriously disrupt a business, distracting managers, diverting resources, and destabilizing 
relationships with various stakeholders.  The vengeful litigant who commences an 
involuntary bankruptcy against an otherwise solvent debtor may produce a fait accompli, 
inducing the very failure the plaintiff purports to worry about, destroying an otherwise 
sound business in the process.72Involuntary cases thus are not, and should not be, “easy” 
to commence.73  
 Whether voluntary or involuntary, the content of the prima facie case is fairly 
straightforward.  Payment rights, and their violation, are usually easy to identify.   
 2. Public Law Litigation 
 The prima facie case is often more complicated in Public Law Litigation because 
the substantive legal norms and the nature of the organization’s responsibility are more 
contested there than in bankruptcy.  We focus on civil rights cases because the contrast 
with bankruptcy is sharpest there.  
Formally, all public law cases are involuntary; there is no technical analogy to the 
voluntary Chapter 11 petition.  However, defendant administrators are sometimes 
sympathetic to the plaintiffs, believing that a court’s intervention will produce 
administrative changes, new resources that they cannot generate on their own, or judicial 
                                                
6811 U.S.C. § 301. 
69 11 U.S.C. § 303. 
70 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1).  
71 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (providing solvency tests to commence an involuntary case).  
72  They may also find themselves sanctioned, as the Bankruptcy Code penalizes creditors whose 
involuntary petition fails.  11 U.S.C. § 303(i).  See also In re John Richard Homes Building Co., Inc., 291 
B.R. 727 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages to debtor where creditor 
commenced improper involuntary case in bad faith). 
73 They have also been fairly rare.  See Susan Block-Leib, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions 
and Why the Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803 (1991). 
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supervision that will mitigate coordination problems.  Although some critics find this 
seeming conflict troubling,74 it represents an analogy to the voluntary Chapter 11 petition. 
 With or without sympathetic management, a plaintiff’s prima facie case generally 
involves three elements. 
 First, the plaintiff has to show some harmful conduct that violates a legal duty.  If 
the duty is specific (say, a statutory prohibition on corporal punishment in schools) or the 
conduct is egregious enough (say, rape of a prison inmate), its illegality will not be 
controversial.  Often, however, there will be a dispute as to whether conduct violates 
some general constitutional standard, such as the Fourth Amendment prohibition on 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures or the due process requirement that individuals in 
state custody receive “appropriate” treatment.  In elaborating such standards, courts often 
look to informal social norms connoted by terms such as “shocks the conscience” and 
sometimes to professional standards.  In these cases, expert testimony is common and 
usually necessary, especially where professional standards are relevant.75 
 Second, if the conduct directly causing the harm was performed by frontline 
officials, some additional showing of responsibility is required for relief against senior 
officials or a public entity.76  Doctrine disclaims respondeat superior in public law cases.  
It is not enough, as it usually is with private law claims in bankruptcy, that the frontline 
agent was acting within the scope of his employment. If the defendant has explicit 
policies furthering the unlawful conduct or its senior officials have ordered or encouraged 
it, that will be sufficient.  If, however, the conduct or conditions that the plaintiffs 
challenge is not the direct consequence of explicit policies or commands, plaintiffs will 
have to show “deliberate indifference” by senior administrators, which means knowledge 
of the conduct and at least tolerance of it.77.  For example, excessive force by police 
officers may contravene a defendant-agency’s express policies, but nevertheless be 
widespread and accepted by management.  Similarly, plaintiffs may complain of 
pollution in a waterway or unsanitary conditions in a jail not because managers cause 
these conditions directly, but because managers cannot credibly claim ignorance of them 
or legitimately fail to address them. 
 Third, the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct is systemic – that is, 
more than a series of idiosyncratic incidents.  In bankruptcy, the systemic nature of the 
defendant’s wrong – the likelihood of its defaulting on a large but indeterminate range of 
its obligations – is shown through financial statements.  In Public Law Litigation, there is 
no comparable standard form of proof, at least where the conduct in question is 
unauthorized or contrary to articulated policy, such as excessive force by police or prison 
guards.     
                                                
74 See notes below and accompanying text. 
75 See, e.g., Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that the “shocks-the-conscience test” 
governs substantive due process challenges to executive conduct); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 
(1982) (interpreting the right to training and freedom from restraints of involuntarily institutionalized 
mental health patients in terms of what “an appropriate professional” would deem “necessary”). 
76 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
77 Id., at []. 
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 The plaintiff usually begins with testimony from members of the plaintiff class of 
episodes of frontline misconduct causing serious harm.78   This will be followed by 
evidence of the failure of the defendant to adopt practices assertedly essential to 
compliance – for example, use-of-force reporting for police, or contracting practices 
enabling timely response to equipment malfunction by housing authorities, or training in 
learning disabilities for special education administrators.  Sometimes these practices are 
mandated specifically by statute.  More often, they are supported by expert opinion about 
customary norms or by published standards of professional organizations.  In addition, 
plaintiffs may present data about aggregate outcomes or conditions – for example, racial 
or gender disparities in arrests, average waiting times for processing applications, 
sickness or injury rates for prisoners.  Testimony about specific episodes is necessary but 
usually insufficient.  When combined with evidence of systemic practices and evidence 
that the practices violate customary or professional standards, it can support a finding of 
systemic violation, but there are no clear lines that define a sufficient showing.79 
 It is arguable that a fourth element of the prima facie case should be political 
blockage.  As we have noted, it is naïve to suppose that the political process will 
routinely correct the systemic deficiencies in the defendant’s activities. However, there 
may be situations in which politically-induced correction seems imminent or under way.  
Courts do not speak of political blockage as an element of the prima facie case, and they 
usually do not assess political circumstances beyond ritual acknowledgment of the 
principle of presumptive deference to executive (and state) authority.  However, the 
likelihood that systemic violations will be corrected without court intervention is relevant 
to the traditional equitable requirement of irreparable injury.  If self-correction is 
imminent, judicial intervention is not necessary to avoid irreparable injury.  Occasionally, 
courts do recognize recently-initiated reforms as a reason for denying or deferring 
systemic relief.80  This is akin to the implicit requirement that a Chapter 11 case be 
                                                
78 The plaintiffs must also show standing – a discrete and imminent personal injury that will be remedied by 
the requested relief.  This is requirement is easily satisfied in many cases.  The most notable exception 
involves policing, where Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), held that standing to seek 
injunctive relief against a practice of unlawful choke-holds did not arise either from the fact that the 
plaintiff had been subjected to the hold in the past or that he routinely used the streets patrolled by the 
police who engaged in the practice.  According to the case, the plaintiff would have to show that the 
plaintiff was distinctively likely to be subjected to the practice in the future.  This requirement has made 
police cases more difficult, but it has not proven insuperable.  Moreover, standing is not a problem for the 
federal government which has authority under 42 U.S.C § 14141 to bring cases challenging patterns and 
practices of unlawful police conduct. 
79 For a police case involving all these types of proof, see Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F.Supp.2d 417 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
80 Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting as reason for refusing 
to certify class seeking systemic relief that, even if the plaintiffs established liability at trial, "the Court may 
not have been in a position to provide for more relief than simply encouraging continued effort and 
improvement by [the defendant]"); see also HAAR, supra note 31, at 154-69 (reporting that the judge in the 
Boston harbor case repeatedly invited political officials to moot judicial intervention by formulating a 
remedial plan on their own initiative and entered an injunction only after concluding they were not likely to 
do so without a court order).   
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commenced in “good faith,” which is often taken to mean that the debtor’s problems are 
multilateral, and cannot readily be resolved by a traditional legal mechanism.81 
 C. The Problem of Representation 
 Since the basic rationales for both bankruptcy reorganization and PLL assume 
collective action problems that make direct participation of all affected parties infeasible, 
the interests of at least some stakeholders in both types of cases must be protected 
through representation.  Thus, both fields have doctrines and structures designed to make 
representation effective. 
 1. Bankruptcy 
 The problems of scale that impede coordination prior to bankruptcy do not vanish 
when a company enters the process:  A corporate debtor will have just as many creditors 
(if not more) after it goes into bankruptcy as before.  Chapter 11 manages this through 
“official” committees of unsecured creditors (and sometimes other stakeholders)82 and, in 
some cases, through unofficial, or ad hoc, committees. 
“Official” creditors’ committees will be appointed in most large Chapter 11 cases, 
composed of creditors holding the seven largest unsecured claims willing to serve.83  In 
theory, members of the official committee of unsecured creditors are fiduciaries for the 
debtor’s larger body of unsecured creditors, and must be “representative” of that body.84  
This can be problematic where different creditors may have claims against different 
debtors in the corporate group or their claims arose in different ways (e.g., contract 
versus tort; bondholders versus employees).  Moreover, it often glosses over differences 
in the normative salience of the underlying conduct giving rising to claims.85  Both tort 
victims and trade creditors are likely to be unsecured creditors of a corporate debtor.   
                                                
81 See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 84 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1035 (2011). 
82 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a). 
83 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b).  Official committees usually exclude secured creditors as well as shareholders.  
Secured creditors are generally presumed to prefer strategies that maximize the value of their collateral, 
which may conflict with the debtor’s continued use of the collateral.  Shareholders, by contrast, are likely 
to prefer high-risk/reward strategies that may waste the debtor’s residual value (although, as noted, if it 
appears that a debtor’s equity has some value, a court may in rare cases appoint a committee of equity 
security holders to represent shareholders).  As discussed below at notes __ , employees may serve on a 
creditors’ committee, although that is somewhat unlikely. 
84 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2); See also In re Bohack Corp. v. Gulf W. Indus. Inc., 607 F.2d 258, 262 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (holding that creditor's committee represents the interest of all creditors and must carry out its 
fiduciary duty so as to safeguard the rights of the minority as well as the majority of creditors). 
85 This has been especially acute in the cases of Catholic dioceses confronting significant liability for sexual 
misconduct by priests.  See Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail:  The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 
S. CAL. L. REV. 363 (2006).  Although not conventional corporate debtors, these religious organizations 
have used Chapter 11 just as the airlines and asbestos-makers have.  Yet, as one of us has observed, they 
present acute examples of the problems of cashing legal claims out: “It may be that other mechanisms of 
reconciliation and resolution would produce better results than those generated by our system. . . . . [O]ur 
current thinking about bankruptcy fails to account for cases like those involving diocesan debtors.”  Id. at 
370. 
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However constituted, an official committee is granted powers under the 
Bankruptcy Code to investigate the debtor's affairs, participate in the restructuring 
process, and pursue causes of action against those who may have harmed the corporate 
debtor if managers of the debtor decline to do so.86  The debtor’s estate—not individual 
creditors—bear the expenses of the committee members and the fees and expenses of the 
professionals the committee retains (e.g., lawyers and accountants).87   
 The creditors’ committee’s most important role is usually in the negotiation of a 
reorganization plan for the debtor.88  In the first instance, management of the corporate 
debtor has the exclusive right to promulgate such a plan for the first 120 days of the 
case. 89   The committee is expected to review and react to it, using confidential 
information provided by the debtor about its operations and prospects.  Prior to plan 
promulgation, the committee is expected to negotiate with the debtor’s management and 
other major stakeholders (e.g., secured creditors) about major actions in the case, such as 
requests by the debtor to borrow money during the case or to continue or reject ongoing 
(executory) contracts. 
 As in all aggregate litigations, a central concern involves the fidelity of those who 
represent the debtor’s body of stakeholders. 90   In the early 20th Century, the 
reorganization system was plagued with complaints that “protective committees” acted 
not for the benefit of the widely-dispersed bondholders they supposedly protected, but 
instead the insiders who controlled the debtor corporation.  These concerns led to major 
changes in reorganization practice, such that today the committee structure is policed by 
the United States Trustee, a public official who assures that both committees and the 
professionals they retain act in the interests of those they represent.91 
In large Chapter 11 cases there may be, in addition to (or possibly in lieu of) an 
official committee, one or more “ad hoc” committees of stakeholders.  These are informal 
groups of stakeholders with a common agenda. For example, holders of certain classes of 
bonds issued by a debtor may form an ad hoc committee to pursue collectively a position 
they consider to be advantageous. Because ad hoc committee members are not 
fiduciaries, observers worry that they may be excessively litigious or, in extreme cases, 
take opportunistic positions that harm the reorganization effort. 92  Although modern 
                                                
86 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(en banc). 
87 ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, Final Report and Recommendations, 23 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2015) 
88 Israel Goldowitz, Garth Wilson, Erin Kim, & Kirsten Bender, The PBGC Wins A Case Whenever the 
Debtor Keeps Its Pension Plan, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L.R. 257, 289 (2015). 
89 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a). 
90 Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of 
Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 749 (2011). 
91 See In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir.1990) (describing the United States trustee as “a 
watchdog rather than an advocate” protecting the public interest). 
92 See Letter from Hon. Robert E. Gerber to Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules, 6 (Jan. 9, 2009), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK%20Suggestions%202008/08-BK-MSuggestion-Gerber.pdf. 
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practice includes a number of mechanisms to prevent the abuses of the protective 
committee, there remain concerns that the aggressive tactics ad hoc committees 
sometimes take may undermine the effectiveness of the official committees that are 
expected to be more broadly representative.  
Despite these imperfections, representative participation through official and 
unofficial committees is considered the most effective available means of policing and 
negotiating with management in order to restructure the debtor. 
 2. Public Law Litigation 
 Representation occurs in PLL in two principal ways.  First, through the class 
action mechanism, the named plaintiffs’ lawyers purport to represent an entire class of 
similarly interested people, and judges have some responsibility to assess the typicality of 
the named plaintiffs’ claims and the ability of their lawyer to represent the entire class.93  
Defendants can defeat or impede a suit by showing inadequate or biased representation; 
so they sometimes purport to act as watchdogs for the under-represented members of the 
plaintiff class.94  Once the class is certified, its lawyers have fiduciary duties to both the 
class representatives with whom they are in personal contact, and the unnamed class 
members.95   
 Second, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participate as parties and/or as 
sponsors and employers of the plaintiffs’ lawyers.  NGOs have structures designed to 
make them accountable to their members or beneficiaries.  These structures involve a 
managing board sometimes elected by members and in any event with fiduciary duties to 
serve the organization’s purposes.96   
 The class and, a fortiori, the NGO structures create only weak and amorphous 
accountability.  Weak accountability may be tolerable to the extent conflicts are not 
intense.  In practice, there is often broad consensus within the plaintiff class, and the 
representatives are usually altruistically motivated.  Yet, major disputes sometimes 
emerge, and, as with ad hoc committees in Chapter 11 cases, representatives are 
sometimes accused of bias.  In the landmark Pennhurst case brought on behalf of 
institutionalized developmentally disabled children, class counsel advocated single-
mindedly for deinstitutionalization despite the fact that many parents of children in the 
class thought their children would have been better served by improving the 
institutions.97  The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, which sponsored many 
                                                
93 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) (prescribing as pre-requisites of a class action that the claims of the 
representatives be “typical” and that they will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”). 
94 Moreover, decrees are occasionally open to collateral attack by affected unrepresented interests.  Such 
challenges are occasionally mounted by public employee unions.  Compare Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 
(1989) (permitting collateral challenge by firefighters union to consent decree mandating race-based hiring 
practices) with Floyd v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2014) (denying motion of police union to intervene 
after trial to challenge on appeal decree mandating reforms to stop-and-frisk practices judgment on ground 
of timeliness). 
95 Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002). 
96 See Bob Carlson, Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and Charitable Assets, in STATE ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 203-30 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
97 Robert Burt, Pennhurst, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 354 (Robert Mnookin ed., 1985). 
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school desegregation cases, pushed for years for racial balancing even in predominantly 
minority districts where many blacks believed such efforts futile or excessively costly.  
Blacks who favored a shift to remedies focused on improving the quality of schools in 
minority neighborhoods felt they were not fairly represented by the NAACP lawyers.98 
 In principle, intervention is possible for stakeholders dissatisfied with the lead 
plaintiffs’ positions, and it is possible for plaintiff sub-classes to be formed to contend for 
competing positions.  However, intervention requires organization and resources and is 
therefore not routinely forthcoming.  Intervention has sometimes occurred in school 
desegregation cases, 99  but it is rare in most areas.  In some cases, a stakeholder 
unrepresented in the original action may be able to attack the decree collaterally in a later 
one.100  Most stakeholders, however, would not be able to assert a sufficient interest for 
collateral attack.  In addition, like widely dispersed creditors of a corporate debtor, most 
will lack the resources to pursue it.101 
 A final concern involves conflicts of interest on the defense side. Critics are 
troubled by the fact that administrators sometimes do not strongly contest the plaintiffs’ 
claims and instead settle quickly.  They speculate that such agreement might be 
motivated by the prospect of expanded resources from the decree or the desire to entrench 
favored policies against revision.102  Of course, in principle, defendants are subject to 
mechanisms of accountability to the public, the very mechanisms to which critics point 
when they urge courts to defer to officials on grounds of democracy.  But such 
mechanisms are clearly imperfect.   
Moreover, administrators’ willingness to recognize the legitimacy of plaintiffs’ 
concerns is analogous to corporate managers’ recognition that a voluntary bankruptcy 
will ultimately serve all stakeholders better than individual collection actions when the 
corporation is in distress.  In both spheres, managers may plausibly believe that 
coordination problems require the aid of the court to solve issues being pressed by 
multiple stakeholders. 
D. The Formulation of the Remedy  
                                                
98 Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation 
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).   
99 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles 
School Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244 (1977). 
100 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral attack by white firefighters on a decree 
remedying racial discrimination in employment).  Some PLL proponents oppose collateral attack for 
reasons partly analogous to the rationale for the prohibition of individual creditor actions in bankruptcy: it 
aggravates coordination problems and impedes a coherent resolution of the systemic problems.  Owen Fiss, 
The Allure of Individualism, 78 IND. L. REV. 965 (1993). 
101 Nevertheless, while representation in connection with the formulation of the decree can be limited, there 
is a tendency for the contemporary framework decrees to increase representation in the implementation of 
the decree and in the administrative process itself.  See TAN below. 
102 E.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 122-23; Michael McConnell, Why Hold Elections?: 
Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. L. F. 295. 
DRAFT OF 20171204 
22 
 
 In the kinds of bankruptcy and PLL cases on which we focus, the parties take the 
primary role in formulating the remedy.  In bankruptcy, the role of the court is less to 
define the remedy than to induce the parties to engage with each other and to police the 
effectiveness of the process.  The court’s role is similar in many PLL cases, though it is 
more often called on in these cases to impose a remedy where the parties fail to reach 
agreement.    
 1. Bankruptcy 
 The overarching remedial goal in bankruptcy is the formulation and confirmation 
of a “plan” that restructures the debtor.103   
The Bankruptcy Code contains a fairly elaborate set of rules and standards to 
approve (“confirm”) a reorganization plan, and each step constitutes a bargaining 
opportunity.  First, the plan must have been presented to creditors in a “disclosure 
statement” that contains “adequate information” about the plan and the debtor sufficient 
to enable creditors to vote for or against the plan.104  As a practical matter, the hearing on 
the motion to approve the disclosure statement will often channel—and consensually 
resolve—objections to the plan itself. 
 Second, the plan must have a minimum level of stakeholder support, generally 
speaking, 2/3 in dollar amount and more than half in number of creditors entitled to 
vote.105  Outside of Chapter 11, debt obligations and associated property rights (e.g., 
liens) can be modified only if all (or almost all) creditors so agree. In Chapter 11, by 
contrast, the plan proponent (probably management) must place creditors in classes, and 
then proposes “treatment” for those classes (e.g., payment of a percentage of the claim in 
cash; issuing new securities, etc), which each class accepts or rejects by super-majority 
vote. 106   The logic of Chapter 11 substitutes bargaining and the ballot for strict 
recognition of all pre-bankruptcy entitlements.  
A court may confirm the plan over the dissent of one or more classes so long as at 
least one impaired class has approved the plan and the court finds that the plan is not 
“unfairly discriminatory” and is “fair and equitable.”107   The “unfair discrimination” 
standard prohibits differences in the treatment of classes that are not justified by 
legitimate business reasons.108  “Fair and equitable” is a term of art which operationalizes 
                                                
103 In an unsuccessful reorganization—and at least 1/3 of large cases may be viewed as “failures” in this 
regard—the “remedy” will be conversion to a case under Chapter 7 and hence liquidation, or dismissal of 
the case, which will in turn most likely result in rapid, piecemeal sale of the debtor’s assets.  Smaller 
companies fail to reorganize at even higher rates.  See Lipson and Marotta, supra note 26. 
104 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b).   
105 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).  As discussed below, this glosses over some complexity. 
106 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1)(requiring plan to “designate, subject to section 1122 of this title, classes of 
claims”)  
107 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 
108 The court has substantial discretion in defining legitimacy.  For example, in the Chrysler bankruptcy, 
certain unsecured creditors complained that superior treatment for union claims was unfairly 
discriminatory—to no avail.  See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010). 
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the so-called “absolute priority rule” (APR).  The APR is a core distributional norm, 
providing that dissenting unsecured creditors may be bound to the plan provided that all 
junior interests are eliminated.109  This has the effect of forcing those most likely in 
historic control of the debtor (shareholders) either to propose a plan that in fact induces 
widespread support or to give up their rights.  The prospect of an imposed plan – a 
“cramdown” – operates as a penalty default, a rule that threatens a suboptimal outcome in 
order to induce the better-informed parties to disclose information that might lead to a 
better result.110  Consensus often forms in the shadow of cramdown. 
Management and committees will usually employ experts to advise them on the 
business steps needed to achieve a plan that is, among other things, “feasible.” These or 
other experts may be called on to testify at the hearing to confirm the plan in order to 
enable the bankruptcy judge to assess the plausibility of the proposals contained in the 
plan. 
 2. Public Law Litigation  
 As in bankruptcy, remedies in PLL most often arise from negotiation.  Many 
cases settle before a judicial ruling on the merits, and these settlements stipulate remedies 
which will usually be incorporated in a court order, or “consent decree.”111   
 If the case proceeds to judgment and the plaintiff wins on the merits, public law 
doctrine, like bankruptcy, requires that management be given the first opportunity to 
propose a remedy.112  The plaintiffs will invariably have counter-proposals.  The court 
will respond by encouraging settlement.  Indeed, anticipating such differences, the parties 
will usually begin negotiating over the remedy from the point at which liability is 
established. 
 For the defendant, the possibility that it can negotiate a remedy more favorable 
than the one the court would impose is usually a strong incentive to deal with the 
plaintiffs.  From the plaintiff’s point of view, a negotiated decree has the advantage that 
compliance may be more likely with an order that the defendants have influenced and 
                                                
109  See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 55, at 130; Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and 
Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74-84 (1991) (describing the 
absolute priority rule as foundational). 
110 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling in the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
111  Defendants would usually prefer to settle on the basis of agreements subject to contractual enforcement 
that are not incorporated into decrees.  Lawrence Koerner, Institutional Reform Litigation, 53 N.Y. L. 
SCHOOL L. REV. 509, 515 (2009) (reporting such a practice in New York City).  This course gives the 
defendants more leverage in the event of later disputes over compliance.  The plaintiff cannot respond with 
a motion for contempt in an ongoing action, but must file a new action and obtain an order mandating 
specific performance.  It can seek contempt only when there is failure to comply with the new order.  In 
addition, the plaintiff may have to bring actions to enforce the contract in state court, where defendant state 
officials would often be more comfortable.  Plaintiffs sometimes agree to such arrangements in order to 
avoid protracted litigation over liability.  See generally, Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: 
Settlement Agreements and Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 276 (2010). In 
some cases, the defendant undertakes some commitments under a consent decree and others under a 
contract.   
112 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 401 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1971). 
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agreed to.  From the court’s point of view, a negotiated remedy avoids difficult and costly 
proceedings.113  
 As in bankruptcy, if the parties cannot agree, the court must impose a remedy. 
Except in cases involving narrow issues with clear substantive rules, the liability finding 
will not imply a specific remedy.  The court will have to craft one from competing 
adversarial presentations.  The competing presentations tend to be dominated by expert 
testimony from both defendant officials and experts hired by both sides.  The court is 
likely to mandate practices required by norms in the relevant profession, as described by 
the experts it finds most credible.   
 Whether the remedy is negotiated or imposed, it will be strongly influenced by 
experts, either as witnesses or consultants to the parties.  Plaintiffs are often able to retain 
as experts people who currently hold or are retired from senior administrative positions in 
agencies like the defendant.  They can also draw on standards codified by professional 
associations.  Like operational assessments in bankruptcy, PLL judges do not make ad 
hoc judgments about the organization and structure of the agency: they rely on 
negotiation and expert participation. 
 E. The Structure of the Decree 
 The core of the remedy in each sphere typically involves governance and 
accountability structures rather than sets of specific rules or practices.   
 1. Bankruptcy 
 The key instruments effectuating the debtor’s reorganization will be the 
reorganization plan and the judicial order confirming it. 114   Although the plan must 
contain a number of provisions and is likely, as a matter of practice, to contain many 
optional components, two are central to effectuating bankruptcy’s remedial goals.115 
 First, the plan must provide, directly or indirectly, for the debtor’s effective 
management.  This may require a change in the composition of the board of directors or 
top-level managers, or both.  Some management changes may have been made during, or 
even before, bankruptcy.  If, however, the major stakeholders have not agreed on 
acceptable management for the debtor, the plan is unlikely to be confirmed.  
The plan will usually provide for governance through ordinary corporate 
mechanisms.  For example, it is not uncommon for creditors to have representatives sit on 
the board of directors of the reorganized debtor.  They will then be in a position to 
monitor the debtor’s performance under the reorganization plan and to hold management 
accountable when there are material deviations. 
                                                
113  Susan Sturm elaborates the conditions and limits of consensus formation in PLL in terms of a 
“consensual remediation formulation model”.  Sturm, cited above in note   , at 1421-27 . 
114 The term “decree” is not commonly used in the bankruptcy context, but plan, when confirmed by the 
court, is functionally similar to a PLL decree. Still, a plan “represents a kind of consent decree which has 
many attributes of a contract.” See In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating 
that a plan “represents a kind of consent decree”). 
115 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a). 
DRAFT OF 20171204 
25 
 
 Second, the plan will cleanse the debtor’s balance sheet, chiefly through the 
discharge of debt.  The discharge effectively makes permanent the temporary injunction 
against collection actions imposed through the automatic stay upon commencement of 
the case.  It will also promote new investment in the firm. 
Substantively, the court must find that the plan is “feasible,” meaning that the 
court has determined that “confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by . . . 
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization” of the debtor.116  Feasibility 
requires the reorganization plan to be based on a plausible business plan.117  The business 
plan may not be explicitly incorporated in the reorganization plan, but it will have been 
disclosed to (and probably negotiated with) stakeholders when their consent is solicited, 
and the court will consider it in assessing feasibility.  
Bifurcating the business plan and the reorganization plan permits a level of 
flexibility that can be important to realizing on the promises embedded in the plan.  A 
post-confirmation change in market conditions will likely require a change to the 
business plan.  Because the business plan is not cemented in the reorganization plan, 
however, changing the former does not necessarily require a change to the latter.  This, in 
turn, permits more efficient post-confirmation adjustment.  
Following entry of the confirmation order, most important work in restructuring 
the debtor will occur in short order if it has not already occurred. Thus, there is not a long 
period after confirmation in which the court is likely to play an important, ongoing role in 
the debtor’s reorganization. If the debtor makes the payments or transfers contemplated 
in the plan, then except as the underlying instruments might provide (e.g., earnings 
covenants), there will be no basis for judicial assessment.  If, instead, the debtor defaults 
on its plan-created obligations, it is possible that the bankruptcy court would be asked to 
intercede—but it is just as likely that the entire debt collection process might start again 
(e.g., with a state-court collection suit, etc).   
 
2. Public Law Litigation 
 Key norms hold that the scope of the violation limits the scope of the remedy and 
that the decree should not require more than is necessary to achieve compliance.118  
                                                
116 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). 
117 Compare In re Om Shivai, Inc., 447 B.R. 459 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2011) (Chapter 11 plan proposed by 
debtor whose principal asset consisted of 27-room motel was not “feasible” and could not be confirmed, 
where debtor had experienced positive cash flow, and then only in minimal amount, in only four of past 
eight months while operating as debtor-in-possession, where debtor's plan required it to pay significantly 
more to its creditors than it had shown ability to pay in past.) with In re Red Mountain Machinery Co., 448 
B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011), stay pending appeal denied, 451 B.R. 897 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011) and aff'd, 
471 B.R. 242 (D. Ariz. 2012) (projections prepared by Chapter 11 debtors' chief restructuring officer, the 
same individual whose projections debtors had consistently met and exceeded while operating as Chapter 
11 debtors-in-possession, along with the unrebutted testimony of debtors' expert, were sufficient to show 
that debtors' proposed Chapter 11 plan was “feasible,” as required for confirmation). 
118 E.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 US 343, 357-58 (1996); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 US 70, 88 (1995).  This 
stricture does not apply as a constitutional or common law principle to consent decrees.  However, the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act applies it to all decrees addressing prison conditions.  18 U.S.C §  3626(a)(1). 
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These norms provide little guidance, however.  Even where the substantive wrong can be 
defined precisely, the measures needed to prevent its recurrence are not usually deducible 
from the wrong.  The court can enjoin physical assaults on prisoners, but where systemic 
past violation of this norm has been demonstrated, deterrence will require more.  
Professional standards may be helpful in specifying the required measures, but they are 
rarely beyond debate.  The matter is further complicated by the precept that, even if a 
norm is necessary to deter the conduct in question, the court may forego it if it would be 
too disruptive of other legitimate activities and goals.119 
 Moreover, the issue of whether a given measure is “necessary” involves an 
ambiguity where, as is usually the case, there are multiple reasonable approaches to 
prevention.  It may be necessary to adopt one of the measures, but not any particular one. 
Thus, the issue is better described as whether the measures chosen by the parties or the 
court are “reasonable.”120 
 Some decrees may contain only narrowly tailored provisions.  For example, a 
recent consent decree in Mississippi provides that the defendant school system will not 
use handcuffs as punishment for noncriminal student behavior or for any kind of behavior 
by students under 13 years old.121  Even such a focused decree, however, will usually 
require elaboration of the duty in written policies, communication of the policies to 
officials and the public, training of affected public actors, and some monitoring.  The 
Mississippi school decree prescribes measures of these kinds, including an “oversight 
council” composed of students, parents, advocates, and a mental health professional.122 
 A major category of decrees sweeps more broadly into the administration of the 
defendant agency.  The dominant approach of recent decrees of this kind is a departure 
from earlier practice.  Earlier decrees were often a collection of many specific rules like 
the Mississippi handcuff rule.  A decree with respect to prison conditions might specify 
the minimum space for cells or the temperature of water in the showers.123  Modern 
decrees may still contain some such rules, but they tend to focus on general management 
                                                
119 See, e.g., Peter Shane, Rights, Remedies, and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 557 (1983) (noting 
that mandating immediate release of prisoners would sometimes be the only effective way of immediately 
remedying unconstitutional detention but that “release is never the remedy of first resort” and that courts 
balance the prisoner’s interests against “other legitimate social concerns”). 
120 Frew v. Hawkins, 540 US 431, 439 (2004) rejected the claim that a remedy cannot go beyond the 
specific requirements of substantive law. “The decree does implement the Medicaid statute in a highly 
detailed way, requiring the state officials to take some steps that the statute does not specifically require.  
The same could be said, however, of any effort to implement the … statute in particular ways.”  The court 
concludes that the decree should be approved as long as it represents “reasonable and necessary 
implementations of federal law.” 
121 A.M. v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Bd. of Trs., Order Approving Settlement (May 25, 2012) (3:11CV344-TSL-
MTP, S.D. Miss). 
122 Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement, Certification of Settlement Class, and to Set a Date 
for a Fairness Hearing (Appendix), filed April 4, 2012. 
123 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING IN THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE 
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 40-41 (1998) (discussing decrees that “specify many requirements 
in…painstaking or excruciating detail [including] the wattage of the light bulbs in the cells, the frequency 
of showers, and the caloric content of meals”). 
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functions of self-monitoring and assessment and on transparency and accountability, 
often derived through agreement of the parties, expert guidance, or both. 
 Although there is much variation, we can give a general idea by describing typical 
elements of the most ambitious decrees.124  Such decrees try to create a framework of 
ongoing elaboration and adaptation.  They begin with a general statement of goals or 
norms (for example: “all children deserve a safe and nurturing environment,” police stops 
must be based on “reasonable suspicion”).   
 They may then mandate some upfront structural investments.  These might 
include enhanced information technology for recording and tracking data and increased 
personnel.  The ecosystem decrees usually require important new physical infrastructure.  
For example, the San Joaquin River Restoration Project decree required the construction 
of new channels and ladders to accommodate fish.125  
 The core requirements of framework decrees concern management practices of 
policy-making, monitoring, and reassessment.  Management must develop explicit 
policies or plans for matters that may previously have been left to tacit discretion.  Police 
agencies, for example, may be required to develop and implement explicit use-of-force 
policies.  Prisons may be required to have protocols for responding to medical needs of 
patients.  Child welfare agencies may be required to have both general case plans for 
children in their custody due to abuse or neglect and specific “permanency” plans for 
each child in their care.  
 These policies are likely to have as much or more specificity as the highly 
directive decrees of the past.  However, because under current practice the policies are 
usually not themselves part of the decree, they can be readily revised without approval of 
the court. Revision typically requires consultation or at least notice with or to the 
plaintiffs and/or a monitor.  The plaintiffs will have opportunities to object to them, 
perhaps in some mandated consultation or dispute settlement process, and as a last resort, 
before the court.  But the decree contemplates frequent policy change, and often allows 
defendants to modify the strategies or tactics they employ to reach the goals of the 
decree.  For example, in a child welfare case, “permanency” will be a goal for all children 
in the state’s custody, but the defendant can experiment with different practices to 
achieve it.  
                                                
124 For examples, see (1) the initial consent decree (“Stipulation for Injunctive Relief”) of June 13, 2002 
and the Receivers “Turnaround Plan” of June 6, 2008 in the California prison case, Plata v. Brown (N.D. 
Cal.); (2) the Utah and Alabama child welfare decrees discussed in Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sabel, & 
William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare 
Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523 (2009); (3) the policing decrees described in WALKER & ARCHBOLD, 
supra note 38, at 192 (2014); (4) the San Joaquin River ecosystem decree (“Notice of Lodgment of 
Stipulation of Settlement”) in NRDC v. Rodgers, 506 F. Supp.2d 322 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2006); (5) the 
Kentucky education decree discussed in MICHAEL PARIS, FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE 
POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 165-219 (2010); and (6) the decree (“Settlement Agreement””) of  
July 15, 2011 in the mental health facilities case of United States v. Delaware, (Civ. Act. No. 11-591-LPS, 
D. Del.) (July 6, 2011). 
125  Settlement Stipulation, NRDC v. Rodgers (E.D.Cal., Sept. 13, 2006), at 8-10, available at 
http://www.restoresjr.net/download/settlementrelated/Settlement_Stip_Final_As_Lodged_091306.pdf. 
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 The agency also commits to monitor itself in a transparent fashion.  This means 
collecting and reporting data on both the implementation and the efficacy of the reforms.  
The decree may specify metrics, or it may order the defendant to develop them, perhaps 
in consultation with the plaintiffs or with an expert consultant or monitor.  Other 
provisions may require intensive scrutiny of specific cases or incidents.  For example, 
police decrees prescribe routine review of use-of-force episodes and “early warning” 
procedures that intervene with counseling, training, or discipline where data identifies 
officers as outliers in terms of such factors as uses of force, vehicle accidents, complaints, 
or absences.  These decrees will often mandate or regulate the procedures of an 
independent civilian complaint review agency.126  
 Some procedures, such as the “Quality Service Review,” used in the Utah child 
welfare decree, assess intensively a sample of cases.127  The Quality Assurance system 
developed under the California prison decree reviews data on all medical care and then 
examines a sample in more detail.128  These procedures generally track the tendency of 
modern public administration to appraise frontline practice qualitatively rather than in 
terms of compliance with specific rules or with documentation requirements. The 
qualitative data also generates more nuanced case information that enables defendants to 
adapt frontline practice contemporaneously.  
 In addition, the defendant must reassess the policies periodically or continuously 
in the light of experience.  For example, the Seattle police settlement prescribes creation 
of a Community Police Commission, with broad representation, to review performance 
data and recommend policy changes.  It also mandates a Use of Force Committee within 
the department charged with reviewing reports to determine when practice changes are 
indicated. 129   Ecosystem decrees sometimes mandate increased use of “adaptive 
management.”  For example, the San Joaquin River Restoration decree altered the 
defendants’ water management practices to require more rapid and nuanced response to 
indications of danger to the fish population.  Prior to the decree, managers released water 
to protect fish in accordance with fixed schedules.  The decree required that they monitor 
the condition of the fish continuously and adjust water release continuously.130  
 The emphasis on provisionality and re-assessment leads some courts to mandate 
explicit experimentation.  The New York police decree mandated that the defendant 
undertake a one-year “pilot project” with patrol officers wearing body-worn cameras in 
one precinct in each of the city’s five boroughs.  At the end of the year, the monitor was 
                                                
126  WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 38, at __. 
127  Noonan, Simon, & Sabel, supra note 124, at __. 
128  See Office of the Inspector General, State of California, “Medical Inspections,” available at 
http://www.oig.ca.gov/pages/reports.php#. 
129  W.D. Wash. Civ. Action No. 12. CV-1282), Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of 
Resolution, July 27, 2012, at ¶¶ 3-12, 119-125.  The DOJ’s “Principles for Promoting Police Integrity”—a 
starting point for remedial design in many cases—demand continuous review of various data to determine 
“whether any revisions to training or practices are necessary.”  US Dep’t of Justice, Principles for 
Promoting Police Integrity 23 (2001). 
130  SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION PROGRAM, FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION PROGRAM (Nov. 2010). 
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directed to report on results and deliberate with the parties over whether the practice 
should be adopted generally.131 
 Decrees often provide for monitors or masters.  These judicial officers will be 
appointed by the court, usually from nominations by the parties, and sometimes pursuant 
to their agreement.  They are typically experts in the field.  These officers will have broad 
access to data on relevant defendant activities.  They will periodically assess the 
defendant’s progress toward compliance and report it to the court. They may provide 
information to the plaintiffs and mediate disputes between the defendant and the plaintiffs 
over compliance issues.132  
 The monitoring provisions will often remain in effect for many years after entry 
of the decree, and they typically contemplate periodic reports to the court and episodic 
judicial intervention to resolve disputes about implementation.  While the boards of 
corporate debtors may provide a monitoring mechanism for creditors, a formal monitor is 
unlikely to be appointed during or after plan confirmation, which is a difference from 
PLL practice. 
PLL decrees last longer than Chapter 11 plans, and may appear somewhat more 
directive.  But modern decrees have much in common with Chapter 11 plans.  Both effect 
change at the organizational level through adjustments to the defendant’s management 
and governance.  Both require some degree of monitoring and flexibility.  Both create 
mechanisms that subject their management and governance structures to enhanced 
accountability and transparency.  These structural adjustments are attractive because they 
offer greater likelihood of success than traditional adjudication. 
 F. Financing Reform  
 In both spheres, the court cannot order the provision of financing (with rare 
exceptions in PLL).  Rather, it is up to the defendant, sometimes with the help of 
stakeholders, to find financing either by re-allocating funds it controls or by inducing 
outsiders to invest in the reformed institution. 
 1. Bankruptcy 
 In bankruptcy, creditor pressure may free existing resources by reducing 
unproductive spending that resulted from managerial self-indulgence or inattention.  This 
tighter managerial discipline may also make the enterprise a more attractive investment.  
At the same time, the discharge of debt and the management changes in the plan will 
often induce new investment. 
 As noted above, to gain approval as “feasible”, the reorganization plan also must 
contain credible financing mechanisms.  Increasingly, debtors restructure by selling 
unproductive or non-essential assets under or in connection with a plan.  This permits 
reorganized debtors to concentrate on core operations that, stakeholders hope, will prove 
more profitable in the future.  In some cases, outside investors (e.g., Fiat’s acquisition of 
                                                
131 Floyd v. City of New York, 939 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
132 See Susan Sturm, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062-1091 (1979).  
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Chrysler) take an interest in the company and help finance its exit.133  However a debtor 
finances its operations post-confirmation, those arrangements will be subject to contract 
law and other rules that are largely outside the scope of the bankruptcy process.  
 2. Public Law Litigation 
 In public law litigation, courts cannot discharge obligations of the defendant, and 
public defendants may have less discretion than private ones to shift funds among 
different uses.  Nevertheless, two of the routes by which bankruptcy produces funds – 
more efficient use of existing resources and new investment attracted by a better 
operating plan – are often available.   
 Defendants commonly plead inadequate resources as a reason for the court to 
forego or minimize intervention.  They also often stress that only the legislature has the 
authority to commit new funds to reform. Courts are sometimes sympathetic, especially 
to the separation of powers issues.134  But, just as frequently, they view such claims as 
inconsistent with the rule of law.135    
 Reform does not always entail increased expense.  Ordering decreased 
incarceration or the cessation of police practices that generate lawsuits may actually 
reduce expenses (though it might generate less measurable costs in terms of increased 
crime).  Moreover, as in bankruptcy, reformed management practices will sometimes 
improve use of existing funds or expand access to new funding.  In approving a 
receivership for the Boston Housing Authority, for example, the court noted that the 
agency had been impaired in seeking funding by its failure to produce meaningful 
budgets, in part because it had failed for more than eight months to fill a funded budget 
officer position.136  Frequently, improved management enables the defendant to increase 
receipt of resources it is already entitled to under programs such as Medicaid, special 
education, and the section 8 housing voucher program.137 
                                                
133See Chrysler sold to Fiat-led "New Chrysler" after historic court proceedings, JONES DAY, Aug. 2009, 
http://www.jonesday.com/chrysler-sells-assets-to-fiat-led-new-chrysler-after-unprecedented-court-
proceedings/. 
134 E.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (“When a federal court orders that money be appropriated for 
one program, the effect is often take funds away from other important programs.”); Conor B. v. Patrick, 
985 F. Supp. 2d 129, 157 (D. Mass. 2013) (explaining denial of relief in part by the fact that “redistribution 
of scarce governmental resources [would cause] deprivation of other state agencies of the means to perform 
their functions fully”). Even before getting to the question of remedy, considerations of scarce public 
resources may influence a court in deciding whether to recognize a substantive right.  See Darryl Levinson, 
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
135 Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963) (“[I]t is obvious that vindication of conceded 
constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny than to 
afford them.”); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 164 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming order requiring 
official to complete listing of particular endangered species despite his undisputed claim that order would 
divert resources from enforcement of other duties).    
136 Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 379 Mass. 703, 718 (1980). 
137 See Eighth Report of the Court Monitor, United States v. Delaware, Civ. Act. No. 11-591-LPS, (D.Del., 
Dec. 26, 2015), at 1-2 (explaining that the defendant had funded much its reorganization with payments 
from the federal Medicaid program); available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/826976/download. 
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 Where reform requires new resources, courts can order defendants to make their 
best efforts to find them.  Where the defendant agency has taxing or bonding authority, 
courts have ordered it to exercise the authority.138   More commonly, they order the 
defendant to apply to the legislature or perhaps private sources for needed financial 
support.139  With perhaps surprising frequency, such support is granted.  Many decrees 
have been supported with large legislative appropriations.140  Fresh support volunteered 
by NGOs sometimes plays an important role.141 
 G. Defendant Recalcitrance  
 In both spheres, courts have difficulty identifying and sanctioning recalcitrance by 
managers of the institution.  In neither sphere do damages or monetary penalties play a 
strong role.  Sanctions tend to be indirect. 
 1. Bankruptcy 
 Historically, the bankruptcy process has been preoccupied with concern about 
management recalcitrance during a case.  Because Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
leaves management presumptively in possession and control of the debtor, in the early 
days of Chapter 11, observers worried that debtors would run amok, wasting time and 
money on professionals, rather than focusing on the reorganization effort.  The Eastern 
Airlines bankruptcy is often invoked as an example of excesses by managers who were 
feckless, if not “reckless”, in “managing” the reorganization of an airline into a fire-sale 
liquidation that should have been avoided.142 
                                                
138 E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (holding that district court may require school district to 
raise taxes necessary to implement desegregation order).  It has occasionally been suggested that federal 
courts can directly order a state legislature to appropriate needed resources, or alternatively, by-pass state 
legislative processes and enact a tax itself.  T.R. Powell, Coercing a State to Pay A Judgment: Virginia v. 
West Virginia, 17 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17-30 (1918) (arguing in context of suit to enforce an interstate compact 
that federal courts sometimes have authority to levy and collect taxes). Although the reach and continued 
validity of this doctrine are unclear, it seems unlikely as a practical matter that a contemporary court would 
issue such orders in PLL.  See generally Gerald Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 715, 770-71 (1978). 
139 E.g., United States v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 554 F. Supp. 132, 139 (N.D.Ill. 1984) (describing 
provision of consent decree obliging both parties to make “every good faith effort to find and provide every 
available form of financial resources” for implementation). 
140  E.g., HAAR, supra note 31, at 200-17 (describing the legislative creation of a new agency with 
borrowing capacity to finance the Boston Harbor clean-up in response to judicial orders); San Joaquin 
River Restoration Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111-11, sections 1001-10203 (appropriating $88 million to 
support the settlement agreement in NRDC v. Rodgers, Case No. CIV S-88-1658 LKK/GGH (E.D. Cal. 
2006)).  In Texas and Kentucky education cases based on state constitutional provisions, PLL suits 
produced comprehensive educational form legislatively supported by codifying statutes and appropriations.  
See James Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging 
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183,    (2003). 
141 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 247-248 (1975) (describing commitments of universities and 
business groups to assist implementation of Boston school desegregation decree).  In several child welfare 
cases, national foundations have provided support to or for the monitoring team or directly to the 
defendant. 
142 Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191, 211 (2005) (discussing “repeated 
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 Yet, the Bankruptcy Code, and practice under it, offer a variety of tools that can 
significantly temper management’s resistance to improved performance.  In some cases, 
they are personal to management; in others, they affect the debtor directly, and thus 
management indirectly.  Perhaps the most draconian power available to a judge is the 
power to terminate or modify senior management, either by appointing a trustee who 
would replace management, or an examiner to investigate management.143  While both 
events are rare in large cases,144 the options to do so likely have an in terrorem effect that 
disciplines management.  
 Chapter 11 also contains other, less direct, mechanisms for dealing with 
recalcitrant management, perhaps the most important of which is termination of the so-
called 120-day “exclusive period” management has to file a plan.145  After that point, 
outsiders can file plans, and these plans are likely to propose new management.  The 
threat of losing control in this way disciplines managers who seek to reorganize the 
company and retain their jobs.  Chapter 11 also provides positive incentives to managers 
who perform well.  For example, corporate debtors may adopt so-called “key employee 
retention programs,” which are essentially incentives to remain with the debtor and work 
toward a successful reorganization.146   
At the entity level, a court may dismiss a case, or convert it to a liquidation under 
Chapter 7.147  This generally has the effect of ending the reorganization effort and, as 
noted above, is very likely to end the debtor as a going concern.148  
If a debtor confirms a plan, and emerges from Chapter 11, the question arises 
whether it will comply with the reorganization plan.  Section 1142 of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides that the debtor “shall carry out the plan and shall comply with any orders 
of the court” and that court may direct the debtor and other parties to “perform any other 
act,” necessary for the “consummation” of the plan.149  This can create a basis for post-
confirmation supervision by the bankruptcy court, although bankruptcy courts tend to 
                                                                                                                                            
extensions of plan exclusivity in Eastern Airlines' Chapter 11 proceedings, which led to the erosion of the 
firm's asset values and a 93% loss of bondholders' original open market claim value, as largely a 
preventable, and now a probably unlikely, court error.”). 
143 11 U.S.C. § 1104. 
144 Lipson & Marotta, supra note 26 at 37 (“Although rare in all cases, trustee motions and appointments 
were also more likely in large cases compared to small cases. Trustees were nearly twice as likely to be 
sought in large cases (7.6% of small cases; 12.6% of large cases), and were over 1.7 times more likely to be 
appointed in large cases (2.1% of small cases; 3.7% of large cases).”). 
145 Pub. L. 109–8, title IV, §§ 411, 437, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 106, 113 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)). 
146 See Jonathan C. Lipson, Where's the Beef? A Few Words About Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 64, 76 (2007) (citing In re Dana Corp., No. 06-10354 (BRL), 2006 WL 
3479406, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2006) (“[S]ection 503(c) was not intended to foreclose a Chapter 
11 debtor from reasonably compensating employees, including ‘insiders,’ for their contribution to the 
debtors' reorganization.”)). 
147 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) & (4). 
148 Conversion and dismissal are rarer among larger than among smaller cases.  Lipson & Marotta, supra 
note 26, at 37. 
149 11 U.S.C. § 1142. 
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view this narrowly.  In part, this may be because the business plan that provides the 
details of the reorganization may not be part of the Chapter 11 plan that is the formal 
decree.  If a debtor fails directly to comply with a provision of the reorganization plan, it 
may be a default that is remedied under section 1142. If, however, the debtor defaults on 
new debt obligations incurred after emerging from bankruptcy, creditors will have to 
resort to ordinary collection mechanisms or anticipate that the debtor will commence a 
subsequent Chapter 11 case.  
 2. Public Law Litigation 
 Once a PLL decree is in place, there are often significant informal pressures on 
defendants to comply.  Defendants may strive to comply because senior agency managers 
recognize the legitimacy of prescribed practices, which are often prevalent in peer 
institutions or supported by professional norms.  Few managers, however, welcome the 
intrusion by the court and the plaintiffs in their day-to-day operations, and the desire to 
get out from under their supervision may motivate compliance efforts even with demands 
they resent.  State agencies are usually defended by the attorney general’s office, and 
these lawyers will be observing their efforts.  In addition, the lawsuit and the decree may 
attract close attention from governors or mayors or other senior officials.  Depending on 
the sympathies of these officials, their attention may generate added pressures for 
compliance and exit from the suit.  In addition, the proceedings and the decree will likely 
generate media attention.  If the plaintiffs’ claims are compelling and they are effective in 
dealing with the media, publicity may add to compliance pressure.  (However, defendants 
are sometimes successful in inducing countervailing political and media pressure against 
the court’s intervention.) 
 Nevertheless, willful or reckless failures to comply are not unusual.  When the 
courts conclude that compliance will not follow from its commands alone, it has coercive 
options.  It can hold the officials in contempt and impose fines or, in theory, 
incarceration. Appellate doctrine tends to disfavor this course.150  Where the violation 
constitutes a breach of a condition of federal funding, the court can order cessation of the 
funding, though such an order is not likely to facilitate compliance.  More aggressively, 
the court can order closure of the program or facility where the offending practices occur.  
Courts are more likely to threaten such action than to undertake it, but they have imposed 
prison population caps, which are effectively partial facility closures.151   
 Courts can sometimes create pressure for compliance by enjoining collateral 
activities that the defendants wish to undertake until they have completed the obligations 
they resist.  For example, a court might enjoin a municipality from granting building 
permits for new construction or a water agency from continuing certain deliveries until 
they undertake action to remedy environmental damage. 152   At the extreme, where 
                                                
150 United States v. Spallone, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (reversing large contempt fines against individual city 
council members despite findings of long history of obstruction); see also Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443, 
442-43 (2009) (noting in the course of reversing on other grounds that the district court imposed contempt 
sanctions of up to $2 million a day). 
151 Brown v. Plata, 563 US 493 (2011)(upholding population cap order). 
152 E.g., HAAR, supra note 31, at __ (noting that the court in the Boston Harbor case threatened to enjoin 
sewer hook-ups for no residences unless action was taken to remedy pollution to the Harbor). 
DRAFT OF 20171204 
34 
 
compliance under current management seems hopeless, the courts can displace 
management and turn over control to a receiver.  They have done so in cases involving 
housing authorities, jails and prisons, mental health and disability institutions, school 
systems, among other public institutions.153  This is, in important respects, analogous to 
appointing a trustee to run a large corporate debtor in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
 In general, courts seem reluctant to adopt coercive measures both because they 
put the court most starkly in opposition to a coordinate branch of government and 
because, if the sanctions prove inadequate to induce compliance, the court will look weak 
or ineffectual.  As with cramdown or liquidation in bankruptcy, courts hope that the 
threat of sanctions will be sufficient to overcome recalcitrance.  They view draconian 
sanctions as a penalty default designed to induce the defendant to negotiate a better 
remedy with the plaintiffs. 
 H. Modifying and Terminating the Decree 
 Active judicial involvement in bankruptcy after approval of a Chapter 11 plan 
tends to be minimal, and plans have relatively short terms.  Because judicial oversight in 
PLL is more extensive and long-term, provisions regarding modification and termination 
of decrees are more important. 
 1. Bankruptcy 
After confirmation, reorganization plans are usually implemented fairly quickly. 
Important governance changes will usually have been front-loaded into the plan, so that 
effectuating them will be something of a formality following confirmation.  Asset sales 
and distributions of cash or securities under the plan will likewise usually occur fairly 
quickly after confirmation.  Failures to do so will usually be interpreted as material 
defaults under the plan, which may have the practical effect of leading a court to 
conclude that the case should be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation or dismissed. 
 For a limited time, a plan can be modified after confirmation, although 
modifications may not undermine the major procedural or substantive elements of the 
plan as it was confirmed (e.g., classification, treatment, etc).  More important, plans 
cannot be modified after “substantial consummation.” Substantial consummation focuses 
on whether the major transactions contemplated by the plan have, in fact, been 
completed.154  If so, then absent provisions in the plan or confirmation order specifically 
                                                
153 Cases approving receiverships or related remedies include Morgan v. McDonough, 540 f.2d 527 (1st Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 97 S.C.t 743 (1977). (imposing receivership of high school in connection with city-
wide desegregation effort); Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703 (1980) (imposing receivership for 
housing authority); Allen v. City of Oakland (N.D. Cal. 3:00 CV 04599-THE), Order of March 3, 2013 
(imposing police department “compliance director”); Plata v. Brown, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 
(imposing receiver to supervise prison health care); Petties v. D.C. (D.D.C. 95-148 [PLF]), Order of August 
7, 2000 (imposing “transportation administrator” for school special needs program); Judge Rotenberg 
Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Mental Retardation, 424 Mass. 430 (1996) (imposing receiver 
for residential facility for developmentally disabled); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Chief 
Exec., 444 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. App. 1989) (imposing receiver for jail). 
154  “Substantial consummation” is defined as “(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property 
proposed by the plan to be transferred;(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under 
the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by the 
plan; and(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1101. 
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retaining jurisdiction,155 the bankruptcy court’s role in the restructuring is for all practical 
purposes at an end.156  
This is not, however, to say that confirmed plans always work.  Rather, a small 
but important number of companies that have operated after plan confirmation and 
consummation have required another Chapter 11 restructuring, either to address 
unsatisfied obligations under the prior plan, or new problems not anticipated at the time 
the earlier plan was confirmed.157Still, Chapter 11 reorganization plans—the heart of the 
restructuring—are confirmed fairly quickly.  All told, pre-bankruptcy negotiations 
through substantial consummation of the plan may occur in one, and rarely more than 
two, years.  This is obviously quite a bit faster than the period during which public 
agencies are typically under judicial supervision in PLL, sometimes running into decades. 
 2. Public Law Litigation 
 The standard for modification of a decree requires the objecting party to show 
changed circumstances that make continued enforcement “inequitable” or “not in the 
public interest.”158  This is uncontroversial in the abstract, but interpretation raises some 
difficult issues.   
 On the one hand, it is important that the defendant not be allowed to respond to 
allegations of noncompliance by relitigating previously settled issues.  On the other, it is 
also important that the agency not be locked into a set of practices that prove costly or 
dysfunctional in unanticipated ways.  Commenters have been particularly concerned that 
in some settlements, officials may use decrees to immunize controversial policies they 
favor against change by subsequent administrations.159 
 In Horne v. Flores, the Supreme Court reversed a district court’s refusal to 
modify a decree regarding English-as-a-second-language instruction in response to the 
                                                
155 11 U.S.C. § 1127(a).  In theory, a confirmation order can be appealed.  However, U.S. Courts of Appeal 
have developed a doctrine of “equitable mootness.”  This holds that an appellate court will not reverse a 
confirmation order following substantial consummation, if doing so would upset settled expectations under 
the plan. In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F3d 272 (3d Cir. 2015). 
156 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 7 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1993).  So, for example, an objection to a plan's 
feasibility is moot where plan has been substantially consummated. In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
157 See UCLA School of Law, Bankruptcy Research Database (Sep. 8, 2016), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/.  
The Bankruptcy Research Database “contains data on all of the more than one-thousand large public 
companies that have filed bankruptcy cases since October 1, 1979.”  Id. It shows that several companies 
have gone through Chapter 11 three times: Anchor Glass Container Corporation (1996, 2002 & 2005); 
Grand Union Company (1995, 1998 & 2000); Harvard Industries, Inc. (1991, 1997 & 2002); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. (1992, 1995 & 2001). The casinos owned and operated by President Trump appear to hold the 
record for repeat-filings, with four sets of Chapter 11 cases, in 1991-92, 2004, 2009 and 2014, respectively.  
See Jonathan C. Lipson, Making America Worse:  Jobs and Money at Trump Casinos, 1997-2010 available 
at [] (Sept. 24, 2016) (empirical study of employment and revenue patterns at Atlantic City casinos in 
connection with Trump casino bankruptcies). 
158 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).   
159 McConnell, supra note 102; Horne v. Flores, 557 US at Slip 11-12; H. Peter Metzger and Richard A. 
Westfall, The Great Ecology Swindle, 15 Policy Rev. 71 (1981). 
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defendant’s claim that it was no longer appropriate in the light of changed circumstances.  
The new circumstances included recent research indicating that methods other than those 
contemplated by the decree might be more effective and a new accountability regime 
required by federal statute that addressed language proficiency.160  The good faith of the 
defendant’s claims was suspect given its minimal efforts to comply with the decree from 
the outset, but the Supreme Court remanded with instructions to the lower court to treat 
the claims with more deference.  The opinion clearly signals a more accommodating 
attitude toward defendant requests for modification.  However, it does not explicitly 
change the requirement of “changed circumstances” making the decree “inequitable” or 
“not in the public interest” as a condition of revision. 
 When the issue is termination rather than modification, the formal standard is 
“substantial compliance.”  This is generally understood to involve both current 
compliance with substantive obligations and “sustainability” – demonstrated likelihood 
that the defendant will remain in compliance.  Sustainability can be supported by 
evidence that practices of monitoring and re-assessment associated with improvement 
will remain in place.161  
 Decrees often have a fixed term, though they can be extended if compliance is not 
achieved by the end of the term.  Some decrees contemplate termination when the agency 
has met specified outcomes.  Outcomes might include installation of up-to-date 
information technology or achievement of specified caseload levels for social workers or 
the reduction in waiting times following requests to see prison doctors.  More ambitious 
targets are more qualitative: for example, a reduction in sustained use-of-force complaints 
against police officers or a specified percentage of children in placements deemed 
“acceptable” by some audit process.  Qualitative outcome targets can be risky because 
unforeseen circumstances often affect what can reasonably be expected by way of 
outcomes.  Another approach emphasizes scores focused on the quality of practice, an 
“input”, as opposed to an outcome, measure.162 
 Courts are sensitive to the negative appellate and public reaction to cases 
involving decades-long judicial supervision, so they are often wary of requests for 
extension.  There seems to be at least a tacit understanding that the court should terminate 
the decree when continued intervention seem likely to be fruitless even if substantial 
compliance has not been attained.   
 There is some doctrinal dispute as to whether a defendant who is not in 
compliance with the decree can seek termination on the ground that the agency is 
nevertheless complying with the relevant substantive law requirements.163  In the absence 
                                                
160 537 U.S. 433 (2009). 
161 See, e.g., R.C. v. Walley, 475 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1123-28, 1134-83 (M.D. Ala. 2007) for an exceptionally 
thorough and thoughtful application of the “substantial compliance” standard.   Horne v. Flores seems to 
accept the sustainability requirement by referring to “durable compliance”.  537 US at __. 
162  Decrees in cases involving child welfare systems that emphasize an audit process involving qualitative 
measures of both practice and outcomes are described in R.C. v. Walley, 475 F.Supp. 2d 1118 (M.D. Al 
2007), at __ , and Noonan, Sabel, & Simon, supra note 124, at __.   
163  See Mark Kelley, Saving 60(b)(5): The Future of Institutional Reform Litigation, 125 YALE L.J. 325 
(2016). 
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of a showing of changed circumstances, such requests amount to a demand to relitigate 
matters the decree purported to resolve.  Yet, the defendant ought to be heard where it 
says that it has discovered and implemented means to remedy the violations on which the 
decree is premised other than those specified in the decree.  Such claims are suspect 
where the defendant has not made good faith efforts to comply with the decree, but they 
ought not to be categorically dismissed. 
 PLL’s “substantial compliance” standard sounds like, and shares important 
characteristics with, Chapter 11’s “substantial consummation” standard.  In both cases, 
the court seeks evidence that the defendant or debtor has not only developed an 
acceptable plan, but also that it has largely been implemented to the satisfaction of most 
constituencies.  Neither standard requires perfection, and both embed an expectation of 
good faith.  Both operationalize the rule-of-law values that undergird these spheres.  
While the details and timing of each differ, both are the main exit from judicial 
supervision, signaling that the remedial effort was likely to have been largely effective.  
 IV. Complaints about Public Law Litigation in the Light of the Comparison to 
Bankruptcy 
 The foregoing shows that courts and stakeholders approach public law litigation 
and bankruptcy in similar ways:  courts respond to mass default by facilitating negotiated 
improvements in governance and accountability rather than inserting themselves into the 
day-to-day operations of the organization.  Public law litigation has been more 
controversial than bankruptcy reorganization, but many objections to the former would 
be, if valid, applicable as well to the latter.  The comparison to bankruptcy suggests some 
helpful responses to such objections as well as positive arguments for the role of courts in 
addressing disputes arising from institutional dysfunction, which we set forth in this Part. 
 A. Objections to Public Law Litigation 
 1. Courts are not authorized or equipped to administer complex organizations.164   
 A basic challenge to the legitimacy of public law litigation asserts that structural 
remedies require the court to exercise “executive” powers and hence to violate the 
separation of powers.  A functional variation emphasizes that judges lack the expertise 
and resources to engage in restructuring and ongoing supervision of organizations. 
 The legitimacy challenge assumes an implausibly rigid conception of judicial 
function.  Contemporary discussion overlooks the broad range of administrative functions 
American courts have played.  In the 19th century, judges superintended a variety of 
functions now associated with administrative agencies.  They oversaw the regulation of 
ship safety, the distribution of federal land, and the award of veterans’ pensions.165  Then, 
as now, they administered estates and oversaw business reorganizations.  In these 
activities, judicial personnel were not just reviewing decisions by executive officers but 
were often themselves making original decisions about compliance, eligibility or 
distribution. Few contended that such activity was inappropriate or outside the “judicial 
                                                
164 E.g., Yoo, supra note 2; SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2; and HOROWITZ, supra note 2. 
165 JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 121-37, 188-204, 256-67 (2012). 
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power”.166  Today, both the increased volume and complexity of claims has forced judges 
to adopt sophisticated management practices even with respect to conventional private 
law and criminal cases.167   
 The bankruptcy analogy provides a direct response to the concern about judicial 
expertise.  In neither bankruptcy nor PLL will a court directly manage an organization or, 
in most cases, specify its operations in detail.  Instead, it seeks in the first instance to 
induce the parties to negotiate the reforms needed to bring the organization into 
compliance.  More often than not, all or part of PLL decree, like a bankruptcy plan, will 
reflect broad agreement.  After that point, the court’s role is to induce compliance with 
the decree and settle disputes about interpretation and modification—not to proscribe or 
prescribe its terms.  Where agreement is not achieved, the court may choose among 
competing proposals by the parties, usually based on expert opinion.  As with the 
bankruptcy plan, the thrust of the PLL framework decree is to set out a managerial 
framework that promotes responsible and transparent decision-making going forward by 
the professionals best suited to make those decisions--management.  After the decree is 
entered, the court’s role is primarily to enforce the decree, as it would with any order. 
 2. Liability findings do not entail any particular remedy; hence judicial authority 
is unconstrained.168   
 In both bankruptcy and public law litigation, judges may exercise authority over 
organizational matters not specifically regulated by doctrine.  This has led to claims that 
judges in PLL act outside the rule of law.  In fact, judges in both contexts are disciplined 
in three ways: social norms, stakeholder consensus, and performance measurement. 
 Some dimensions of the remedy are dictated by business or professional norms.  
In cases of dispute, norms can be established by expert witnesses or consultants.  In 
bankruptcy, for example, courts draw on established business norms to determine 
whether a plan is feasible. 169   Comparable norms are often available in public law 
litigation.  For example, in policing, norms have emerged regarding use-of-force 
reporting, civilian complaint review, and “early warning” intervention regarding problem 
officers. 
                                                
166 The exception that proves the rule is the controversy around the statute challenged in Hayburn’s Case, 2 
U.S. 409 (1792).  Three Supreme Court justices suggested on circuit that a statute providing for pension 
applications to be addressed to and decided by judges violated Article III.  The putative defect, however, 
was not the conferring of initial decision-making on judges; it was the subjection of the judges’ decisions to 
review by executive officials. 
167 Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 3, at   (emphasizing the administrative dimension in such private law 
activities as the enforcement of money judgments and family law decrees); Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1983) (emphasizing the critical role of judicial case management in a world 
where most cases settle); Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383 (2007) 
(discussing instances of administrative reform within the court system of the criminal process). 
168 Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1920, at 1953-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra 
note 2, at 104-09, 123. 
169 See Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 443 (1999). 
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 In bankruptcy, the most important discipline of judicial remedial authority comes 
from the need for agreement among stakeholders and bankruptcy’s priority rules.170  Key 
remedial choices under a plan are made by the parties, subject to judicial approval.  In the 
face of serious recalcitrance either by management or creditors, a court will likely 
threaten (and perhaps impose) default penalties ranging from appointing a trustee to 
liquidating the debtor.  All have the effect of depriving major stakeholders of the 
opportunity to negotiate an alternative remedy.  When the plan process works—as it 
usually does in large cases—the court will have helped to induce fair participation by 
affected interests which, in turn, confers legitimacy on the process and advances the 
system’s underlying welfare-maximization norms.  In addition, the success or failure of 
the plan will be visible, and failure will reflect on the court.  
There are analogies in PLL.  A negotiated plan is not a requirement, but judges 
tend to facilitate negotiation by the parties and sometimes consultation with other 
stakeholders. For example, the remedies opinion in the New York police case asserts that 
“community input is [a] vital part of the remedy in this case.” Accordingly, the order 
requires appointment of a facilitator to organize a “remedial process,” including “’town 
hall’ type meetings in each of the five boroughs in order to provide a forum in which all 
stakeholders may be heard.”171  Reformers seek consensus because it makes compliance 
more likely, and because it enhances the legitimacy of judicial intervention.   
 Finally, some constraint on judicial authority arises from performance 
measurement.  Bankruptcy incorporates basic accounting measures and reporting 
practices designed to make success or failure visible.  Since poor financial performance 
will tangibly affect stakeholders, its prospect disciplines stakeholder negotiations, and 
since it will reflect more diffusely on the court, it probably constrains it as well.  Courts 
want salvageable debtors to reorganize successfully, and to rapidly liquidate those that 
are not.   
Something similar occurs in PLL.  Consistent with emerging public 
administration norms, reforms typically mandate performance measurement and 
reporting and may specify metrics.  Thus, success or failure should become more visible, 
even as the restructuring may permit or promote some managerial flexibility.  As these 
measures make the agency more accountable, they also provide evidence of whether the 
court’s intervention has been beneficial.   
                                                
170 Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors' 
Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1271 (2013) (“Creditors begin by bargaining inside a priority framework. 
Existing rules reflect and implement that bargain, for the most part.”).  See also Czyzewski v. Jevic 
Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 978, 197 L. Ed. 2d 398 (“A distribution scheme . . . cannot, without the 
consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary 
mechanisms the Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”). 
171 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  The Cincinnati police case 
produced a widely noted process of community engagement.  See John E. Eck & Jay Rothman, Police-
Community Conflict and Crime Prevention in Cincinnati, Ohio, in PUBLIC SECURITY AND POLICE REFORM 
IN THE AMERICAS 224- 44  (John Bailey & Lucia Dammert eds 2006). 
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 3. Non-compliance is often due to budget inadequacy, and it is either undesirable 
or infeasible for courts to mandate increased appropriations.172 
 We have noted that some PLL reforms do not increase expenses, and some 
increased expenses can be met with resources freed by new management practices.  Yet, 
it is undeniable that many decrees depend on new resources. 
 In neither bankruptcy nor public law litigation do courts produce these resources 
by appropriating them directly.  In the bankruptcy context, the parties must convince 
lenders or investors of the viability of the company and their plan in order to secure any 
necessary financing.  Although courts have some capacity to cajole recalcitrant current 
lenders to provide more reasonable terms, they cannot force a lender to lend, or a debtor 
to borrow.  Nor could it otherwise induce outside investors to make new equity infusions 
in a debtor.   
In the public law litigation context, a highly assertive decree may order executive 
officials with taxing or borrowing authority to exercise that authority.173  But courts often 
disclaim such authority, and even where it might be available, seem reluctant to exercise 
it.174  More often, a decree will require the defendant to make its best efforts to seek 
resources from others  It might require the defendant to petition the legislature, some 
other government entity, or private sources for the needed support.  As a practical matter, 
legislatures have great capacity to resist such requests.  The court can threaten to shut 
down a facility or enjoin some activity (such as permitting new construction) that the 
legislature favors.  But courts are reluctant to follow through on such threats, and 
legislatures know that.  Private institutions are usually free to refuse to support reform. 
 Thus, it seems likely that the success of public law litigation in inducing enhanced 
resources for reform rests, as in bankruptcy, substantially on forces other than the 
coercive power of the courts.  One important factor is the persuasive force of the claims 
and the court’s order.  The plaintiffs and the court will have mobilized stakeholders, 
assembled arguments and evidence, and focused public attention on the problems.  The 
legitimacy of the framework decree can make future investment in an agency by a 
legislature palatable, and possibly attractive, just as a restructured debtor under a Chapter 
11 plan may be a more attractive candidate for private financing.  In any case, the 
political pressures that courts in public law litigation may place on legislatures are well 
within our established constitutional framework.  Whether exerted politically or through 
market-incentives, courts in both spheres can induce new funding for judicially-
restructured organizations. 
 Moreover, like bankruptcy, a public law decree may attract support from both 
public and private sources by making new investment seem more promising.  Like a 
Chapter 11 plan, a PLL decree may have enhanced safeguards against waste, improve 
                                                
172 See sources cited in note 168; also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 91-92; HOROWITZ, supra 
note 2, at 257-60. 
173 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (holding in the context of a desegregation suit that the court 
may order the defendant school board to increase taxes).  
174 Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 368 Mass. 333 (1975) (reversing on sovereign immunity grounds an order 
requiring state officials to borrow money to fund statutorily required improvements in public housing).  
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accountability mechanisms, and reflect a more promising operating plan.  And to the 
extent the plan has the support of the parties (and perhaps other stakeholders, such as 
service providers), it gives some reassurance to the legislature that the new resources will 
settle the controversy and achieve political acceptance.  It is evidence that those affected 
by the underlying system view the plan favorably. 
 4.  PLL decrees ignore the polycentric nature of institutional reform.  If you pull 
on one strand of the spider’s web, the pressure will radiate to others.  For example, if you 
mandate strict compliance with welfare application processing deadlines, agencies will 
shift workers from case maintenance to eligibility determination at the expense of the 
former.175  
 This complaint is not made in bankruptcy.  The reason for its absence there is 
equally applicable to public law litigation, at least to the relatively comprehensive 
framework decrees.  Courts don’t intervene piecemeal.  Rather, they try to intervene 
broadly, inducing enterprise-wide (or in public law litigation, agency-wide or program-
wide) plans.   
 Moreover, polycentricity is not a problem unique to structural litigation.  An 
individual money judgment or a narrowly tailored injunction will also require resources 
to implement, and without new appropriations, these resources may come at the expense 
of other activities.  Indeed, sometimes corporate debtors require bankruptcy because, as 
in the Texaco bankruptcy, the company has suffered an adverse judgment so severe as to 
impair its ordinary operations.  Bankruptcy can be a firm-wide response to a problem that 
was originally bilateral in nature. 
Judges in cases seeking narrow equitable relief are sometimes told to try to take 
account of collateral effects of their orders on other agency activities.176  But it may be 
more difficult for them to do so when the liability determination implicates only a narrow 
range of the defendant’s activities.  By putting broad swaths of interconnected activities 
in issue, structural relief forces attention to the relationships among activities and 
encourages explicit and systematic articulation of priorities.  And the framework 
approach permits adaptation as new problems are discovered. 
                                                
175 SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 91-92; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254, 278-79(1970) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that adding procedural safeguards for welfare terminations will divert 
resources from processing new applications). HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 35-45; MARTIN WEST & JOSHUA 
DUNN, FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 8-10 
(2009).  The term polycentricity was popularized among lawyers by Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits 
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). 
176 NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 721-13 (D.C.Cir. 1975)  (holding that, in considering a request for 
injunctive relief, a court should take account of collateral effects of the requested order on other activities 
of the defendant) Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U.S. 581, (1999) (“In evaluating a State’s fundamental-alteration 
defense, the District Court must consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only the cost 
of providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others 
with mental disabilities, and the State’s obligation to mete out those services equitably.”).  But courts 
sometimes refuse to consider the collateral effects of narrowly tailored orders.  E.g., Forest Guardians v. 
Babbitt, 174 F3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999)  (refusing to consider an administrator’s claim that 
compliance with a court order requiring specified endangered species determination would leave 
insufficient resources to perform other duties).  To the extent that courts refuse to consider collateral 
effects, judgments in non-structural cases may have the polycentricity problem critics attribute to PLL. 
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 Note the paradox:  If the framework rather than command-and-control approach 
to structural relief is taken, relatively comprehensive intervention is often more tractable 
than narrowly focused intervention.  Judicial rhetoric emphasizing narrow tailoring of 
remedy to right is thus misguided.  In bankruptcy, the right to payment sounds like it 
demands a simple remedy: payment.  In individual collection, that is what happens.  But 
when a large corporate debtor defaults generally, narrowly tailoring remedies to each 
creditor’s claim would be impossibly wasteful.  Coordinating an effective remedy in both 
Chapter 11 and PLL may require—and reflects—wholesale restructuring rather than 
retail rights recognition.  
 5.  Plaintiffs and defendants often conspire to entrench preferred policy solutions 
against political revision and/or to expand agency resources.177   
 In bankruptcy, managers and senior creditors are sometimes accused of 
conspiring at the expense of junior creditors.  Bankruptcy structures and processes create 
a variety of checks to minimize this, including committee oversight, priority rules and 
standards, and the appointment of an examiner or trustee.  But bankruptcy doctrine also 
recognizes that all parties have a shared interest in a successful reorganization, and it 
does not view collaboration as categorically suspect.  Indeed, it seeks to induce 
collaboration, in large part because collaboration within this framework is likely to 
advance reorganization’s larger policy goals of maximizing wealth in the face of financial 
distress.  As noted above, concerns arise with respect to stakeholder representation in 
bankruptcy, but courts and administrative adjuncts (the Office of the United States 
Trustee) have adapted practice to respond.  
 Concerns about management sympathy for or collaboration with plaintiffs in PLL 
are more intense.  Critical discussion seems inconsistent with respect to such issues.  On 
one hand, doctrine often insists on presumptive deference to administrators, even after 
they have conceded liability or been adjudicated liable, on grounds of political 
legitimacy.178  On the other hand, when administrators agree with plaintiffs, they are 
suspected of acting from nefarious motivations, such as empire-building.179   
 A few PLL decrees have been plausibly accused of policy entrenchment, and to 
the extent that it is a problem, the Supreme Court’s demand in Horne v. Flores that 
district courts take seriously claims for modification based on changed circumstances 
addresses this problem.180  However, policy entrenchment is less likely to be problematic 
in the large range of public law litigation decrees that take the framework approach.   
Moreover, the framework decree emphasizes process and accountability and 
leaves the defendant broad discretion to change practices so long as it does so explicitly 
and transparently.  Disputes can still be brought to a monitor appointed under the decree, 
and ultimately the court, but the presumption with respect to such matters is in favor of 
                                                
177 Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S at __; McConnell, supra note 102.   
178 E.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (stating that it is the responsibility of the “political 
branches to determine how prisons should be managed to vindicate inmate rights”). 
179 McConnell, supra note 102; SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 122. 
180 567 U.S. 433 (2009). 
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flexibility.  Such decrees are more accommodating of change than Horne v. Flores 
requires. Indeed, their general tendency is to induce adaptation rather than entrenchment.   
 In general, administrative sympathy for or agreement with plaintiffs should not be 
presumptively suspect.  Where managers seem inadequately motivated to oppose 
plaintiffs on specific contestable matters, that should be treated, as it is in bankruptcy, as 
a problem of representation, not as a categorical objection to structural remedies.  
Problems of representation in aggregate litigation are hardly novel, and courts in a variety 
of contexts have developed means of addressing those problems.181 
 B. Positive Arguments  
 Courts are institutional reformers in both bankruptcy and PLL, our study suggests, 
because they have unique capacities to induce reform.  We summarize here several of the 
most important capacities common to both spheres. 
 First, courts are independent of market and political forces.  While there will 
sometimes be claims that judicial decisions are politicized in some way, no legal actor is 
likely to be less burdened by political or market pressures than courts. Thus, courts 
occupy a special place in relation to the dysfunctions that contribute to the conditions that 
often produce the need for restructuring in the first place. Courts can induce reforms in 
both bankruptcy and PLL because they are removed from the causes of system failure 
and the political and market pathologies that often prevent extra-judicial reform. 
 Second, judges in both bankruptcy and PLL have developed special operating 
capacities to facilitate reform that give them a comparative advantage under conditions 
where more conventional reform mechanisms fail.  For example, while judges are not 
experts in the substantive fields of the institutions they help to reform—whether police 
departments or airlines—they are experts in delimiting and resolving disputes.  Thus, in 
both bankruptcy and PLL, judges are able to assess the transparency and fairness, 
including the adequacy of representation, of the process that produced the agreement.  At 
the same time, they are likely to promote agreement where possible to achieve plans of 
reorganization or settlement agreements that embody large areas of consensus, so long as 
they appear credibly responsive to the underlying problem.  Subjecting these agreements 
to judicial review provides an independent check on the propriety and feasibility of the 
agreed restructuring which enhances their persuasive and instrumental force.182 
To the extent courts cannot induce agreement, judges retain the power both to 
coerce through adjudication and to declare the law in order to help establish norms that 
will guide future disputes.  These more traditional adjudicative functions are not 
displaced by judges’ efforts to facilitate agreement, but they instead work in tandem.  No 
one doubts that judges have a comparative advantage over other market and legal actors 
in using traditional litigation techniques to decide disputes in other contexts, and the same 
                                                
181 See generally Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.17 (2010) (discussing ethical issues in 
aggregate litigations). 
182  Chayes anticipated these points in 1976.  See Chayes, supra note 3, at 1307-08  (the judge’s 
“professional tradition insulates him from narrow political pressures”); & 1308 (the court “is also rather 
well situated to perform the task of balancing the importance of competing policy interests in a specific 
situation.”).  For elaboration, see Strum, supra note  , at 1382-1409. 
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would appear to be true in bankruptcy and PLL.  And, because judges are experts in 
dispute resolution, their warnings to parties about the costs and benefits of the choice 
between litigation and settlement are likely to have significant credibility.   
Third, courts may have a comparative advantage in their capacities to produce and 
manage information.  Both Chapter 11 cases and the civil litigations in PLL require the 
production of significant amounts of information, much of which becomes part of the 
public record, either through the litigation process or the plans and decrees that resolve 
these cases.  The public character of this work imposes a level of accountability on courts 
and parties not likely to be found elsewhere.  While the negotiations that lead to or 
implement resolution may not be public, the factual record upon which decisions are 
made will be.183  Moreover, the public record thus produced increases the capacity for 
parties in future cases to gauge their likelihood of success and to learn techniques for 
resolution that might not otherwise be apparent.  Courts have long been understood to 
play an educative role generally.184  The transparency of their work in bankruptcy and 
PLL is no different.  
This is not to say that bankruptcy or PLL is perfect.  Indeed, observers and 
practitioners criticize both, and we can imagine future work offering specific examples of 
developments in bankruptcy that might improve PLL practice.  For example, early 
practice under the Bankruptcy Code was, as noted, challenged for the delay and cost 
associated with the Chapter 11 process. This led some to argue that Chapter 11 should be 
eliminated185—just as some today argue that we should eliminate PLL.  Instead, however, 
cooler heads prevailed, and the Chapter 11 system adapted.  A similar adjustment has 
been underway in PLL, and is likely to continue.  The evolution from “command and 
control” PLL decrees to “framework” decrees has been, in part, a response to criticism 
about the rigidity and duration of the earlier decrees, and their lack of success in 
producing reformed public systems.   
 V. Conclusion 
Critics have for many years chastised courts supervising public law litigations 
even though that same role and functionality are the daily diet of courts supervising 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  For these critics, the message of this paper is simple:  If PLL is 
an illegitimate judicial activity, then so too is Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Since no one 
would seriously make the latter claim, critics of PLL should more carefully assess the 
character and grounds of their opposition. 
We do not suggest that PLL or bankruptcy should be immune from criticism.  The 
mere fact that courts in both contexts do substantially similar work does not mean that 
they always do it well.  Indeed, we think there are likely important areas for improvement 
in both contexts, for example and in particular, the duration of PLL decrees, which we 
                                                
183  
Cf. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1308. 
184 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 
(1992). 
185 Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale L.J. 1043, 1050 
(1992).  
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reserve for future work.  But arguments about legitimacy merely distract from those more 
concrete projects.  An implication of this paper is that scholarship about PLL should 
focus not on whether we should have it, but how to make it more effective. 
We thus recognize that neither PLL nor Chapter 11 are optimal solutions. As in so 
many contexts, the real choices available to parties confronting large-scale failure are 
amongst what Neil Komesar would call “imperfect alternatives.” 186   No avenue for 
organizational reform—legislature, market, court—is ideal. We have shown how and 
why courts are often a better choice for the difficult work of institutional reform in PLL 
by reference to the highly analogous work they do in bankruptcy.   
Organizational restructuring is an inevitable feature of post-bureaucratic society.  
Contrary to PLL’s critics, we have shown how and why courts play a significant role in 
the difficult and important work of facilitating these reforms. 
 
####### 
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